

# POGROMS, NETWORKS, AND MIGRATION

The Jewish Migration from the Russian Empire

to the United States 1881–1914<sup>\*</sup>

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## Abstract

The mass migration of Jews from the Russian Empire to the US is commonly believed to have been caused by two waves of pogroms (1881–1882 and 1903–1906). This view has recently been questioned by historians, but little quantitative evidence exists to support or refute it. I construct a data set that links hundreds of thousands of Jewish immigrants (1900–1914) and Jewish hometown-based associations (1861–1920) to their places of origin, and geo-locate hundreds of pogroms. I find no evidence that the Jewish migration was started by the first wave of pogroms; instead, subsequent migration continued along a pre-existing spatial trend and originated from districts that did not experience violence. The second wave of pogroms, however, did meaningfully increase the rate of migration from affected districts. I interpret these findings as an indication that prior existence of migration networks is a necessary condition for push factors to cause migration, and that these networks tend to spread through a process of spatial diffusion. This leads to a new understanding of the causes of the Jewish migration and poses a challenge to the push-pull consensus paradigm in the economic literature on the Age of Mass Migration.

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# 1 Introduction

Refugees fleeing persecution and violence or economic migrants? This question stands at the core of the current European Migrant Crisis, one of the greatest political and economic global challenges of these days, but it is hardly a new one. The same question was raised more than a century ago, in regards to the plight of Jewish migrants who were leaving Russia en masse. With the benefit of hindsight and with the lens provided by the comprehensive data generated out of the paper trail this event has left behind, the Jewish migration is an excellent historical case for understanding how ethnic violence interacts within the migration decision. As it turns out, unraveling the previously-unknown geographic patterns of the migration of Russian Jews also provides unprecedented evidence regarding the crucial role played by the diffusion across space of migration networks.

Jewish migration from the Russian Empire to the United States in the years 1881–1914 was one of the greatest voluntary transnational population movements in history. Over a single generation, more than a third of the Jewish-Russian population of 5.3 million (as of 1897) was resettled overseas. An overwhelming majority, 1.5 million, arrived in the United States (see yearly rates of migration in Figure 1). The timing of this migration, as well as its unique demographic composition, with an exceptionally high dependency ratio, have commonly been thought had been linked to two waves of *pogroms*, which were outbreaks of anti-Jewish mob violence,<sup>1</sup> that took place during 1881–1882 and 1903–1906. Historians now doubt the existence of such a link (Klier 1996, for a representative example), and quantitative evidence to bolster their suspicion has recently emerged (Kuznets 1975; Stampfer 1986; Perlmann 2006; Platt Boustan 2007). The purpose of this paper is to provide systematic evidence regarding the local effects of pogroms on migration using very large and informative data sets generated from several sources that have not fully been exploited to date.

This paper also provides indirect, yet new and illuminating evidence about one of the most important questions in the economics of migration: Do networks of chain migration advance over time and space in a process of spatial diffusion? Scholars are divided as to why transatlantic migration from the poorer east- and south-European periphery began several decades after that from the wealthier west- and north-European countries. The diffusionist view, mainly expounded by Gould (1980), Baines (1995), and Moya (1998), argues that this pattern is partly explained by a slow spatial diffusion of chain-migration networks over the continent. In contrast, Hatton and Williamson (1998) doubt that this could have significantly affected the timing of the beginning of mass migration. Instead, the delayed mass migration from the periphery is explained by internal economic and demographic conditions, such as late industrialization and urbanization, increasing demographic pressures, and the need to reach a threshold level of income in order to overcome the liquidity problem of financing migration. This question has been hard to answer conclusively, in

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<sup>1</sup> On the meaning of the term pogrom in Russia see Klier (1992).

part because doing so requires fine and uniform migration data over a long span and a large territory. By examining the patterns of development of a mass migration of a fairly uniform population, across more than five decades, over a very large geographic range (greater than the combined area of Germany, France, and Britain), with a high spatial resolution, and within a single polity, this paper also makes a unique contribution to the understanding of the economics of mass migration. The analysis provides novel evidence demonstrating that some large-scale patterns of mass migration cannot be understood without reference to spatial diffusion of migration networks.

I use a new panel data set combining a number of sources. First, I compiled individual-level data on migration through Ellis Island, covering 2.33 million Russian passengers, of whom more than 40 percent were Jews. I matched these records to the towns from which the immigrants had come, yielding a unique panel covering yearly migration from more than 200 districts over the period 1900–1914.<sup>2</sup> Second, I assembled a complementary data base on the local origins of Russian-Jewish migration during the years 1861–1920, based on records on the incorporation of 1,476 *landsmanshaftn*—Jewish hometown-based associations founded in New York. The data on these associations enables a mapping of the evolution over time of the geographic sources of early Jewish migration, through the four decades prior to the period covered by direct migration data from Ellis Island. Third, I collected and geo-coded lists of pogroms that cover most of the events that occurred during the two waves. Finally, I coded comprehensive town- and district-level data from the 1897 Russian census, on the local demographic and economic conditions of both the overall population and of the Jewish population alone. I test the hypothesis that the pogroms were a major cause of the Jewish mass migration by providing evidence on the following questions: (a) Did the 1881 pogroms start the Jewish mass migration? (b) Did the second wave of pogroms increase its magnitude? And (c) did the second wave of pogroms affect its demographic composition, making it look more “permanent”, with a greater share of non-labor-force participants?

For the first wave, for which no individual-level information is available, I use the *landsmanshaftn* data as a proxy for the geographic origins of recent immigration, which I show to be a sufficiently accurate measure at an aggregate level. The evidence for the relation between the early wave and the pogroms reveals very sharp patterns, and it is best presented by a series of maps rather than by regression analysis. The benchmark assessments of the effects of the second-wave pogroms on migration are estimated using year-district-level difference-in-differences OLS regressions, testing whether the flow of migration from pogrom-districts in the 9 years after the pogroms (FY 1906–1914) increased since the 6 years prior to the pogroms (FY 1900–1905) more than in similar districts that did not experience a pogrom.

The empirical analysis reveals previously unknown, sometimes surprising patterns; above all, that the geographic evolution of Jewish migration followed a gradual spatial pattern, and at times was at

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<sup>2</sup> A district (*uezd*, in Russian) was an administrative sub-division of a province (*guberniia*), with an average area roughly 50 percent greater than an average U.S. county. The Pale of Settlement comprised 25 provinces with 236 districts.

odds with what one might predict based on the distribution of pogroms or economic push factors. The onset of Jewish mass migration was geographically unrelated to the 1881 pogroms; rather, post-1881 migration originated from areas not subject to pogroms and was a continuation of pre-1881 trends. Moreover, contrary to the assumptions of some historians, the pioneering areas of Jewish-Russian emigration during the 1860s and 1870s were clustered in a restricted part of the Congress Poland along the border with Germany.<sup>3</sup> Only during the 1880s did this emigration belt thicken and reach the Lithuanian provinces to the east, that subsequently became the heartland of Jewish emigration. It took about a decade longer for mass migration to reach any of the pogrom regions. In fact, last to contract significant emigration was the southern region of New-Russia, hit worse by the first wave of pogroms, and by WWI its districts had yet to catch up with the rates of migration seen in the pogrom-free north.

The second wave of pogroms, however, did induce more emigrants to leave affected districts. A district that had experienced at least one pogrom in 1903–1906 had 10–20 percent more migrants arriving at Ellis Island during the years 1906–1914 compared to a similar district that did not experience a pogrom. The estimates are robust to changes in the definition of the treatment and to the specification of the estimating equation. Considering that regional spill-over effects of pogroms may have played a role in pushing residents of the entire region to migrate, these estimates should be regarded as a lower bound to the actual marginal effect of the pogrom experience. Attempts to identify heterogeneity in the effects of the pogroms fail to find consistent patterns. I find no statistically significant evidence that the demographic composition of migration changed due to the pogroms toward greater share of non-labor-force participants. The key process governing the evolution of migration during the years 1900–1914 was convergence: emigration from districts that were late to send mass migration was growing fastest, and by a very wide margin. This poses the most concrete threat to identification, but despite the fact that more pogroms took place in areas that started sending migration in late, I show that the pogrom effect was not driven by the convergence dynamics.

Thus, there are five previously unknown central findings that require an explanation: (a) Jewish migration started from a narrow area along the German border; (b) there was a strong spatial aspect to its expansion; (c) the first wave of pogroms did not create migration from affected areas; but (d) the second wave of pogroms did increase migration from affected areas; and (e) there was a dominant pattern of convergence in rates of migration. I argue that these findings cannot be solely explained within a traditional push-pull framework of the economics of migration.

On the other hand, these findings are consistent with the diffusionist view. The argument is that chain migration, or personal relations with friends and relatives who had already migrated, is not only a factor facilitating migration, as shown, among others, by [Hatton and Williamson](#)

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<sup>3</sup> Congress Poland (officially known as the *Kingdom of Poland*, later the *Vistula Land*), was a predominantly Polish, previously semi-independent region that comprised the ten western provinces of the Russian Empire. The six provinces of the region of Lithuania in the northwest of the Russian Empire roughly corresponded to the current territories of Lithuania and Belarus; see the map on [Figure 3](#).

(1998), Wegge (1998), Munshi (2003), and McKenzie and Rapoport (2010); in the case of the Jewish migration it was rather a necessary condition for migration. Individuals who did not have a forward link in the country of destination were generally unable to migrate even if they were fully incentivized to do so. Indeed, in the case of Russian-Jews, statistics and anecdotal evidence confirm that almost all cases of migration involved such personal connections. In fact, pioneers were almost nowhere to be found. Thus, the central role of personal links to friends and relatives generated a spatial pattern, as migration networks moved along such short-distance links between neighboring towns and districts. While the non-diffusionist view would argue that pioneer migrants would spontaneously start a chain of migration in an unlinked region when the demand for migration becomes sufficiently high, it appears that at least in some cases this did not happen. The onset of mass migration within a given district was triggered by, and dependent on, neighboring districts having previously gone into mass migration. In this manner a geographic pattern of spatial diffusion from the northwest toward the east and the south was generated.

This can explain why certain regions that were later revealed to be strongly prone to produce mass migration started doing so only a decade or two after the pioneering regions that were near the border. Since the regions in which the first wave of pogroms took place were very far from the early sources of migration, this also makes clear why the first wave of pogroms had no effect on migration from affected districts, whereas the second wave, that took place when affected regions were at least partly linked, did have an effect on migration. Thus, the question of the effects of pogroms on migration is given a complex answer, depending on time and place: migration can be related to pogroms, but only in areas where chain migration had already existed by the time the violence struck.

I consider other explanations for the geographic patterns of the Jewish migration that do not include spatial diffusion of migration networks. Some of them are inconsistent with certain pieces of evidence: There were no local economic shocks that could provide a crucial difference between the early migration region and other regions of similar or worse living standards. Nor is it the case that the first Jewish-Russian migrants were mainly coming from towns that took part in the early Polish and Russian industrialization. Other alternative explanations are likely: Proximity to the German border, through which almost all Jewish migrants had to cross before reaching their ports of embarkation, as well as the costs of internal travel within the Pale to the German border, could have affected the geographic patterns of migration on the margin. Similarly, the evolution of the Russian railway system was partly correlated with the spread of emigration centers. But alone these are yet incomplete explanations, and they leave too many patterns unexplained.

Based on the findings, I propose a new hypothesis on the evolution of the Jewish migration from Russia. The incentives and the potential for mass migration may have existed decades before they materialized, and one need not look for concurrent changes in internal circumstances that increased incentives for migration during the time of its acceleration. Instead, the beginning of mass migration in each region within the Pale of Settlement depended strongly on the time in which

migration networks reached its vicinity. However, once contracted with the “migration epidemics”, districts were catching up with their migration potential, whose magnitude, as opposed to the time in which it began, did depend on local circumstances such as standards of living or pogroms.

This paper does not deal directly with the effects of the general administrative, legal and popular persecution of Jews, other than through pogroms, on the overall magnitude of the Jewish-Russian migration. Nevertheless, the explanation I provide for why the Jewish migration started en masse only during the last decades of the nineteenth century can complement, or even stand as an alternative to the view that this timing was a result of either the pogroms or the subsequent intensification of persecution.

## 2 Background

### 2.1 Jews in Late Imperial Russia: A Brief Overview

The Russian Empire was home to some 5.3 million Jews in 1897, more than half of world Jewry. Almost all of them, 94 percent, resided in a restricted territory known as the Pale of Settlement, comprising the 25 western provinces of the Russian Empire. Residence of Jews beyond the Pale was severely restricted by a set of laws and statutes (Klier 1986). Within the Pale, the Jewish population was typically concentrated in small provincial market towns, known as *shtetl*.<sup>4</sup> Jews specialized in certain occupational sectors: almost none were farmers, and about a third were employed in manufacturing. Another third were employed in trade and commerce, an occupational niche Jews dominated in absolute numbers, despite comprising only 9 percent of the Pale's population.<sup>5</sup>

Under the Tsars the Jewish population experienced very rapid population growth, as much as five-fold during the nineteenth century (Stampfer 1989).<sup>6</sup> As commonly described, by the end of the century it was poverty-stricken, and for the most part adversely affected the transformations brought about by the advent of Russian and Polish industrialization, particularly in the north-western region of Lithuania and in Congress Poland to the west.<sup>7</sup> The southwest region and the southern region of New-Russia probably had somewhat improved standards of living. The relations between the Jewish population and the Russian Tsars, the bureaucracy, the Intelligentsia, and the people, were complex and at times tumultuous.<sup>8</sup> The ever-pending Jewish Question remained a bone of contention by the end of the Imperial period.<sup>9</sup> Never able to achieve the goal of equal rights, above all the abolition of the restrictions of the Pale, many Jews felt threatened by constant attempts of a repressive monarchy to discriminate against them and to encroach upon their communal autonomy and their traditional ways of life.

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<sup>4</sup> On the definition and the nature of *shtetl* see Klier (2000), Pinchuk (2004), Polonsky (2004), and Tcherikower (1961). For a social-economic history of the *shtetl* in the early nineteenth century see Petrovsky-Shtern (2014).

<sup>5</sup> See Spitzer (2015a). Also see Rubinow (1907) and Kahan (1986). On the selection of Jews into urban pursuits before 1492 see Botticini and Eckstein (2012).

<sup>6</sup> The convention is that this rapid increase was largely responsible for a deterioration of the standards of living. How the Jews were at all able to transcend so far beyond the Malthusian pressures is a question that requires further study. The most advanced attempt to address it is Kahan (1986).

<sup>7</sup> On the effects of industrialization see Kahan (1986) and Peled and Shafir (1987). The standard claim on the negative effect of industrialization is that mass production, market modernization, and more efficient modes of transportation and services obliterated much of the traditional Jewish roles as local middlemen, small artisans, and providers of services that rely on traditional pre-modern institutions, such as leasers of economic privileges of the nobility (milling, tavern-keeping, etc.) or money-lending. According to Lederhendler (2009), by the end of the nineteenth century, Jews were pressed down to an almost uniformly impoverished proletariat cast. Anthropometric evidence on army recruits finds that Polish Jewish conscripts were shorter than non-Jews, and that the gap between the two groups increased from 2.5 to 4 centimeters between the birth cohorts of 1840s and 1890s (Kopczyński 2011).

<sup>8</sup> Dubnow (1916) is the fundamental study of this topic, notwithstanding many revisions of views since its publication. See also Baron (1976) for a general overview.

<sup>9</sup> Klier (1995) is a comprehensive coverage of the period 1855–1881. For the late-imperial period see Rogger (1986).

The 1881 crisis that followed the assassination of the relatively liberal-minded Tsar Alexander II, and the ascendance to throne of his reactionary son Tsar Alexander III, is often considered a “turning point” in Jewish History.<sup>10</sup> It marked the emergence of new political ideologies, such as Zionism and revolutionary Socialism, and not least, the beginning of mass overseas migration. A wave of pogroms, anti-Jewish mob violence, broke out that year in the southern city of Elizavetgrad and spread out to many other towns in New-Russia and the southwest. It was followed by the notorious *May Laws* of 1882 and a series of anti-Jewish legislations that further restricted the rights of residence, education, occupation, and political representation of Russian Jews. The prevalent view that there was some orchestration of these pogroms from the top or behind the scenes has been dismissed in a number of revisionist studies from the past generation.<sup>11</sup> Nevertheless, there is little question that the pogroms and the anti-Jewish legislative surge contributed to the sense prevalent among Jews and other observers that the conditions of the Jews in Russia had become intolerable. Mass emigration was increasingly perceived as a possible systemic solution.

Two decades later, anti-Jewish violence broke out again throughout the Pale with increased ferocity. First came the atrocities of the 1903 Kishinev Pogrom, where dozens of Jews were brutally massacred and thousands affected. Then followed a massive wave of hundreds of pogroms, mostly concentrated in a single week in October (o.s.), 1905. This time, the casualties and the damage were far greater, and it became clear that the Russian state was at best reluctant to take up the duty of defending its Jewish subjects.<sup>12</sup> A few more events took place in 1906, and while no more pogroms broke until WWI, Russian Jews remained in a precarious and uncertain political condition.

## 2.2 Pogrom-driven migration?

Between 1881 and 1914, 1.5 million Jewish immigrants migrated to the United States from the Pale of Settlement.<sup>13</sup> It is commonly believed that this mass migration was directly linked to the pogroms.<sup>14</sup> The time pattern of Jewish-Russian migration, seen in Figure 1, appears consistent with it: 1881, the year pogroms erupted as a wide-spread movement, is commonly seen as its starting point; the year 1906, after the second wave of pogroms, saw the greatest flow, with 125

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<sup>10</sup> A thesis expounded by Frankel (1981). For a contrary gradualist view see Nathans (2002). Recently, Bartal (2006, p. 5), concurred with a few reservations regarding Frankel’s thesis but reaffirmed 1881 as a “significant milestone”. On the other hand, Klier (2011) forcefully rejected any notion that the 1881 crisis was a real turning point with lasting effects.

<sup>11</sup> Rogger (1986), Aronson (1990), Rogger (1992), and most comprehensively Klier (2011).

<sup>12</sup> On the second wave of pogroms see Lambroza (1981) and Lambroza (1992).

<sup>13</sup> The most comprehensive quantitative study of the Jewish migration is Kuznets’s (1975) seminal work. Godley (2001, Table 5.4) revised Kuznets’s estimates for the years 1881–1898.

<sup>14</sup> The section of the Dillingham (1911, part III) Report dealing with the Jewish immigration from Russia rejected the idea that it was mainly driven by economic motives; instead, “Let but the pogroms cease and the emigration of the Jews will immediately and considerably diminish and will resume those insignificant proportions which it displayed until the pogrom of Kishinef [sic]” (p. 281). This view still echoes in the general literature on migration (e.g., Holmes 1995, p. 148; Hoerder 2002, p. 341). Examples of influential monographs on the Jewish migration that highlighted persecution as a motive are Hersch (1913) and Wischnitzer (1948).

thousand U.S.-bound Jewish Russian migrants.<sup>15</sup> Moreover the demographic composition of Jewish migrants was much different than other ethnicities, with a far greater dependency ratio, supposedly an indication for migration driven by non-economic motives.

The *Brody Episode* was a case in point and an example of a direct link between pogroms and early emigration. The 1881 pogroms generated a flight of refugees that flocked across the Austrian border and remained stranded in the Galician town of Brody. International Jewish organizations provided relief for pogrom victims and erected a refugee camp. Rumors that refugees would be supported in emigration to America unintentionally attracted thousands of additional border-crossers during 1881 and 1882. The true numbers are unknown, in this period perhaps as many as ten thousand were indeed assisted in migration to America ([Lestschinsky 1961](#), p. 59, fn. 15), but most of the refugees were resettled in Russia or found their way to other European countries until the camp was finally dispersed in 1883.<sup>16</sup>

“It is hard to find a textbook which does not attribute this mass movement to the pogroms, physical and legislative, which befell the Jewish subjects of the Tsar,” wrote John D. Klier ([1996](#), p. 22), the prominent scholar of Russian Jewry; “[t]here is just one problem for the historian: it does not work.” This view reflects what is, arguably, the current consensus among historians, differing from the folk conception of pogrom-driven migration. One of the main reasons to believe that pogroms did not play a major role in inducing the migration was the observation that Jewish immigrants from pogrom-free Lithuania were over-represented, whereas relatively few came from the southern provinces where most of the violence took place.<sup>17</sup> Indeed, a number of recent studies have provided quantitative evidence affirming this geographic pattern.<sup>18</sup>

Following [Kuznets \(1975\)](#), most historians now believe that economic and demographic conditions were the main causes for the Jewish migration. He argued that endemic poverty in the Pale, particularly in Lithuania, exacerbated by demographic pressures and harmful effects of industrialization explain why and when the Jews migrated. Viewed against the backdrop of the rising number of other east- and south-European immigrants, pogroms need not be the primary explanation for the migration of Russian Jews. Moreover, both non-Jewish minorities from the Russian Empire, par-

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<sup>15</sup> Additionally, the temporary sharp increase in migration in FY 1892 is associated with a wave of deportation of Jews from large cities outside the Pale.

<sup>16</sup> [Szajkowski \(1942\)](#) and [Klier \(2011, Ch. 11\)](#). Szajkowski’s widely cited article carried the title “How the Mass Migration to America Began,” and stated that following the liquidation of the camp “The stream had begun to move and continued to flow of itself toward America” (p. 304).

<sup>17</sup> This geographic pattern was already speculated by [Rubinow \(1907\)](#), a speculation reiterated by [Kuznets \(1975\)](#), although “firm data to test the hypothesis of differential propensity toward emigration among the regions of the Pale are lacking” (p. 117). In this ground-breaking paper, for which the adjective “comprehensive” would be a gross under-statement, the question of the geographic origins of the Jewish-Russian migration was the only stone left unturned.

<sup>18</sup> [Stampfer \(1986\)](#), based on the distribution of hometown-based associations; [Godley \(2001, Ch. 5\)](#), based on marriage records of Jewish immigrants in London; and [Perlmann \(2006\)](#), based on two cross-sectional samples from the Ellis Island records. However, [Alroey \(2008, Table 4, p. 51\)](#), reported a rather proportional representation across the Pale’s regions, based on lists of applicants for support in emigration.

ticularly Poles, and Jews from Austrian Galicia who had been granted equality of rights and did not suffer pogroms, migrated in great numbers as well. Indeed, [Platt Boustan \(2007\)](#) demonstrated in a time series study that the variation in the scale of the Jewish-Russian migration is largely explained by business cycle fluctuations, and that additional migration during pogrom years was only modestly greater.

However, previous evidence is quite coarse. While the broad pattern of over-representation of Polish and Lithuanian provinces appears to be rather robust,<sup>19</sup> the insight it provides into the link between pogroms and migration is rather limited: the variation in the occurrence of pogroms was not only across regions, but also within regions, even provinces. Understanding this link requires higher resolution of data, both temporal and geographical, in order to separately identify the effects of the pogroms from both the effects of business cycles and other time-varying factors, as well from local characteristics or regional trends that originate from causes other than pogroms. This paper benefits from a new district-year panel data of pogroms and migrations, enabling for the first time to identify the local effects of pogroms based on panel-data variation.

### 2.3 Migration and Diffusion

Previous studies assumed that the leading role in migration played by the Pale's northern provinces was a result of their comparatively disadvantageous standards of living. I argue that an alternative diffusionist hypothesis must be considered, one relating this lead, at least in part, to the position of these provinces along the path through which migration networks had spread. An explanation of this sort was brought forward by [Zelinsky \(1971\)](#), [Gould \(1980\)](#), [Baines \(1995\)](#), and [Moya \(1998\)](#) for the late advent of transatlantic mass migration from the eastern and southern periphery of Europe, as well as to some within-country geographic patterns of emigration. According to this diffusionist view, gradual diffusion of migration networks across space was an important reason for why countries such as Italy and Russia generated almost no transatlantic migration prior to the 1880s, despite being significantly poorer than Britain, Germany, Ireland, and Scandinavia, where the rates of pre-1880s emigration were the strongest. It is possible that the internal conditions in the European periphery were ripe decades earlier, but that mass migration was delayed simply because these countries were further away from early regions of emigration.

On the other hand, according to the view of [Easterlin \(1961\)](#) and [Hatton and Williamson \(1998\)](#), which is arguably the current consensus among economic historians of the Age of Mass Migration, the time in which European countries had begun to send large numbers of migrants across the Atlantic was determined primarily by internal conditions, such as the advent of industrialization, urbanization, and demographic pressures. As discussed above, following [Kuznets \(1975\)](#), a similar

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<sup>19</sup> The discrepancy between [Alroey's \(2008\)](#) finding with that of other studies, cited above, may be due to the nature of the data he collected and to the period it covers. Support in emigration were needed more in areas in which chains of migration were weaker; moreover, the applications data are from the later years of the migration, when, as we shall see, the geographic distribution of migrants had become more balanced.

explanation stands as the consensus view among historians of the Jewish migration. The southern and eastern European periphery took decades longer to produce mass emigration because industrialization and other transformative processes arrived there late. [Hatton and Williamson \(1998\)](#) dismissed the diffusionist view by stating that “[...] it offers few empirical predictions and says nothing about why emigration rates eventually decline.” (p. 15). The empirical findings in this paper pose a major challenge to this consensus: it shows that at least in one significant case, that of Russian Jews, the evidence overwhelmingly supports the alternative diffusionist view.

## 3 Data

### 3.1 Sources

I collected data from several sources to produce the panel data base on the Jewish migration used in this paper. Individual-level data from the Ellis Island arrival records were used to create direct migration data at the level of the year-district over the 15 years FY 1900–1914. Incorporation records of immigrants’ hometown-based associations provide indirect indication for the geographic origins of migration over the period 1861–1920. Economic and demographic cross-section data on the districts of the Pale was coded from the 1897 Russian census; and locality-level data on pogroms were collected and geo-coded from available lists of pogroms. The following discussion describes these sources, as well as the main challenges and problems associated with the data produced from them.

#### 3.1.1 Ellis Island Ship Manifests

Direct data on immigration are based on the passenger lists submitted by shipping companies to the Bureau of Immigration at Ellis Island, on which the personal details of all immigrants arriving in the facility after 1892 were recorded. Since FY 1900 the last place of residence was recorded, and thus the towns and districts of origin of immigrants arriving since that time could potentially be identified. While passenger lists have long been used as a source in the study of immigration, the records were only recently coded into a machine readable file.<sup>20</sup> The basic sample includes all east-European passengers between 1892 and 1924, more than 5.7 million individual arrival records. Among them were 2.33 million passengers coming from the Russian Empire (or in the last years, from the Soviet Union, Poland, and the Baltic states).

The first challenge pertaining to these data is to identify which of the passengers were Jewish. The identification of Jews as a distinct ethnic group (“Hebrew”) was required by law,<sup>21</sup> but the assignment to the Hebrew category was not coded systematically from the manifests, and many Jews in the data are unrecorded as such. Fortunately, I find that poor identification was rare—coders of ship manifests either transcribed the identification of Jews, or they did not code this at all for the entire ship. Moreover, I find that when the Hebrew ethnicity was coded for the entire ship, this identification was remarkably accurate: around 95 percent of Jews were correctly tagged, whereas no more than 0.5 percent of non-Jews were mistakenly coded under “Hebrew”.<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>20</sup> The other studies that make use of the coded Ellis Island data are [Bandiera, Rasul, and Viarengo \(2013\)](#) and [Spitzer and Zimran \(2016\)](#).

<sup>21</sup> It became practice to record immigrants’ ethnicities since mid-1899, and mandatory since 1903. See [Weil \(2000\)](#) and [Perlmann \(2001\)](#). “Hebrew” was an official category, along side dozens of other ethnicities defined by the U.S Bureau of Immigration.

<sup>22</sup> For details see [yannayspitzer.net/2012/07/24/most-common-jewish-names](http://yannayspitzer.net/2012/07/24/most-common-jewish-names).

Coded manifests of ships that do identify Jews provide an Archimedean point to identify Jews systematically. I developed an algorithm predicting whether each passenger was Jewish or not based on his or her first and last names. As a first stage, it uses the manifests of ships that identified Jews to assign a measure of Jewishness to each first name and last name, as well as to their first- and last-name soundex groups. At the second stage, it predicts whether each passenger was likely to be Jewish based on his or her first and last name. This algorithm yields very few false positives (i.e., cases in which a non-Jew is mistakenly identified as a Jew), while tagging almost all Jewish passengers as Jews.<sup>23</sup>

The second challenge is to determine the last place of residence reported by each passenger and to link it to an actual town in the Pale of Settlement. At several steps along the way the name of the locality could have accumulated errors: the towns typically had Slavic names, but were reported by Yiddish-speaking passengers, and hand-written by a German, British, or Dutch shipping company clerks. Finally, a century later, the writings were deciphered and transcribed by a volunteer ignorant of the geography of the Pale. The strategy to address this problem is to tailor-fit a text condition for each and every town, matching each passenger based on the text of the “last place of residence” field, while taking into account the following difficulties: (a) phonetic variations and errors; (b) graphic errors (such as transcribing H instead of K); (c) different towns with similar names; and (d) towns with multiple names or various pronunciation of the same name.<sup>24</sup>

I used the procedure to identify immigrants coming from the 426 largest Jewish communities, covering more than 3 million Jewish residents as of 1897, out of a total of 5 million Jews in the Pale (and 5.3 million in the Empire as a whole). The effective coverage is surely higher than that, since many Jews coming from very small shtetls tended to report a nearby larger town. Of the 2.33 million Russian immigrants in the file, 1.9 million reported a potentially informative last place of residence; 779,286 of which I identify as Jews; 602,144 of which arrived during the fiscal years 1900–1914; and to 295,626 of whom I was able to link a particular town in the Russian Empire.

I aggregated the town-based identified migrations at the district level by year of migration, to form a yearly-district panel of total migration.<sup>25</sup> To account for time-varying coverage levels, these

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<sup>23</sup> For more details on this algorithm see [yannayspitzer.net/2012/11/24/who-is-a-jew-algorithm](http://yannayspitzer.net/2012/11/24/who-is-a-jew-algorithm).

<sup>24</sup> Previously, [Godley \(2001\)](#) and [Perlmann \(2006\)](#) faced similar tasks of identifying the last place of residence of immigrant Jewish brides and grooms in London, and of immigrants from an Ellis Island sample. Both of them identified the last place of residence observation-by-observation, which was feasible with the sample sizes that were on the order of a few thousand cases. Unfortunately, this is not feasible in the current case where the size of the sample is on the order of hundreds of thousands, and some sort of an automated script is indispensable. On the other hand, a fully automated geolocation algorithm, such as the one used in [Spitzer and Zimran \(2016\)](#) for Italian passengers, would have performed poorly due to the fact that the last place of residence of Russian Jews was generally not transcribed from properly printed identifying documents. Italians could not depart from an Italian port without an official passport, whereas Russian Jews were often unable to acquire a passport, departing without any official Russian document reporting their last place of residence.

<sup>25</sup> There are two reasons for the district-level aggregation of the town-level data. First, the potential tendency to report the name of the next largest town, or the name of the district (which is the typically the name of the

measures are adjusted by multiplying across the board the migration counts of each year such that the yearly total across all identified towns will equal the yearly Jewish-Russian immigration.<sup>26</sup> The adjusted measures must, on average, be upward-biased, since not all districts contained towns that were among the largest 426 Jewish communities. Furthermore, as the effective coverage rate certainly varied across districts, there is an additional upward or downward bias for each district. To the extent that these biases did not vary systematically over the duration of the sample period, the main empirical results will not be affected, as the benchmark specifications control for district fixed-effects that should capture any time-invariant district-specific bias. These biases will distort the identification if they changed over time and the changes were correlated with the distribution of pogroms. Since the same method was used to identify migration flows in each of the sample years, there is little reason to suspect that there are such systematic time trends in these biases.

### 3.1.2 Hometown-Based Associations (*landsmanshaftn*)

For the years prior to FY 1900, the last place of residence was not recorded systematically on the ship manifests. Therefore, I follow [Stampfer \(1986\)](#) and use a complementary source, the *landsmanshaftn* data, in order to map the evolution of geographic origins of the Jewish migrants prior to 1900. A *landsmanshaft* is a generic name for hometown-based associations, prevalent in New York and other large cities in the U.S. since the time of the migration and active well into the second half of the twentieth century. While in many historical cases of mass migration it was customary for immigrants who came from a particular region to form associations of mutual benefit or other purposes in the new country, the extent to which that was done by east-European Jewish immigrants in New York was unprecedented.<sup>27</sup> A survey conducted for the 1919–1920 American Jewish Year Book counted over five thousand Jewish organizations, their total membership exceeding one million, of which 2,421 were “fraternal orders and mutual benefit associations” with 574,163 memberships (See [Schneiderman 1919](#), p. 303).

The proliferation of the *landsmanshaftn* testified to an extraordinary success of this grass-root institution with which almost every household was affiliated. It provided a way for Jewish immigrants to continue the operation of some of the age-old traditional social and economic roles previously assumed by the old-country close-knitted *kehillah* (a corporate Jewish community encompassing all the Jewish population in a town and its vicinity), as well as by more recent local institutions that had developed during the nineteenth century ([Löwe 1997](#)). At the same time it

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district’s largest town). Second, that most of the census data is available only at the district level, not at the town level.

<sup>26</sup> For the yearly Jewish-Russian immigration to the U.S. I use the measures corrected by Godley (2001, p. 73). Since the explanatory variable in the benchmark specification is log-migration rates, this adjustment does not affect the benchmark diff-in-diffs estimators, as it amounts to adding a year-specific constant to the log of migration rate when year-fixed effects are present anyway.

<sup>27</sup> So much so, that the term *landsmanshaft* became an accepted synonym for hometown-based associations in the historical literature ([Moya 2005](#)).

was a new adaptation, designed to provide welfare services in the modern environment of the new country.<sup>28</sup>

I use a list of 3,014 hometown-based associations that were incorporated in the New York County court during the period 1848–1920.<sup>29</sup> As a general rule, the name of the hometown appears as part of the name of the association, such that in most cases deciphering the name of the association and a bit of detective work enables matching it to its hometown.<sup>30</sup> The court records also note the year of incorporation. When immigrants from a particular town had incorporated an association in a particular year, I take it as an indication that around that time the representation in the U.S. of immigrants from the respective town had grown.<sup>31</sup>

The landsmanshaftn list has a number of causes for inaccuracy and incompleteness.<sup>32</sup> While the problems of incorrect enumeration cannot be completely eliminated, there is little reason to suspect that these potential biases are strongly correlated with the characteristics of the districts. In Appendix A I address the question of whether the data on the incorporation of landsmanshaftn truly reflects the rates of migration from the respective hometowns and home districts. I show that incorporation is a good enough proxy for migration and that there is little room for doubt regarding the evidence in Section 4 that relies on the landsmanshaftn data.

### 3.1.3 The 1897 Russian Census

Data on the towns and districts (*uezds*) of the Pale of Settlement and their Jewish population were compiled from the provincial volumes of the 1897 Russian census and from a special census volume on Russian localities (*Tsentral'nyi Statisticheskii Komitet 1905*). Since Jews typically lived in small provincial market towns, in which they formed a majority of the population, the latter

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<sup>28</sup> See [Soyer \(1997\)](#). For a case study on the associations formed by the town of Proskurov see [Milamed \(1986\)](#).

<sup>29</sup> I am thankful to Ada Green, a volunteer genealogist who created the online version of this list and was forthcoming in answering my questions. The list is available online on [www.jgsnydb.org/landmanshaft/ajhs.htm](http://www.jgsnydb.org/landmanshaft/ajhs.htm). Details on its origins are on [www.jgsnydb.org/landmanshaft/ajhsintro.htm](http://www.jgsnydb.org/landmanshaft/ajhsintro.htm).

<sup>30</sup> Landsmanshaftn left an extensive off- and on-line paper-trail that facilitated identification. In particular, I found the various databases and community pages on [www.jewishgen.org](http://www.jewishgen.org) immensely helpful, and I also relied on [Schwartz \(1986\)](#).

<sup>31</sup> [Stampfer \(1986\)](#) used a similar shorter list from [Rontch's \(1938\)](#) directory to learn about the geographic origins of the Jewish Russian immigrants, although his analysis did not include a time dimension.

<sup>32</sup> Associations that were never incorporated, or were incorporated outside Manhattan, would not show up in the list (New York County overlapped with the borough of Manhattan; it did not include New York's other boroughs). Additionally, it is impossible to differentiate within the list a first-time incorporation from an act of change to the name of an association. Also, it appears that on occasion, a group of recent immigrants registered at the same time two associations of distinct purposes, such as a religious congregation and a mutual benefit association. In such cases, the list records two separate associations whereas in practice there was only one group of immigrants. The names of some associations appear in two separate entries, once under a Yiddish, Hebrew, or German name, and again in an English name that was typically, but not always, a literal translation of the former. I made every effort to avoid double-counting. In particular I used the file number that is available on the list as an indicator for whether two entries are in fact one, as well as a comparison of the literal sense of the associations' names in the four languages to spot repeated entries.

source enables a mapping of 4.35 million out of the Pale’s 5 million Jews down to the level of the town, over almost two thousand localities of more than 500 inhabitants (Figure 4).<sup>33</sup> The provincial volumes provide a wealth of information on the demographics of the Jews and of the total population in the 236 districts of the Pale, some of which will be used in the empirical analysis below.

### 3.1.4 Pogroms

Data on the 1881 pogroms were geocoded using the list created by Aronson (1990, pp. 50–56), and the partial mapping of Aronson’s list with a few additional cases by Klier (2011, pp. 22–24). The sporadic pogroms of 1882–1884 were not available as a comprehensive list, but they were fewer in number and they did not occur in provinces that were pogrom-free in 1881. Data on the location and the severity of pogroms during the second wave of 1903–1906 were collected from two sources. The report compiled by Motzkin (1910) includes detailed descriptions of dozens of major events, alongside lists of hundreds of relatively minor pogroms. It was based on an extensive field work by surveyors sent by the office of the Zionist Organization in Berlin, under the leadership of the prominent Russian Zionist activist Leo Motzkin. Since the report was partly based on data that were meant to assess the damage caused by the pogroms to facilitate the funneling of relief funds to the victims, each pogrom entry included comparable measures that enable an assessment severity: numbers of deaths, persons severely and lightly wounded, families affected, houses destroyed, shops destroyed, and total damage assessment in Rubles. I use this measure to create a rough categorization of the pogroms by their severity.

Motzkin’s report, a highly reliable source, was complemented by another less detailed list published in the 1906/7 *American Jewish Year Book* (Szold 1906), that also include some measures of damage caused by the pogroms. It is less accurate, but is nevertheless an important complementary source as it contains a few cases in regions that were not covered by Motzkin’s surveyors. Altogether the second-wave pogroms data include 388 individual towns whose Jewish communities were known to have been hit at least once. According to Lambroza (1981), who collected information from additional archival sources, Motzkin’s report is nearly comprehensive and is largely overlapping with additional archival sources.<sup>34</sup> The benchmark specification in Section 5 uses a district-level pogrom indicator treatment: whether or not a district had experienced at least one pogrom of any severity. I also test for the robustness of the main results to changes in this definition. Alternative

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<sup>33</sup> For further information about the dataset of Jewish communities see Spitzer (2015a) and [yannayspitzer.net/2012/07/22/a-new-map-of-jewish-communities-in-the-russian-empire](http://yannayspitzer.net/2012/07/22/a-new-map-of-jewish-communities-in-the-russian-empire).

<sup>34</sup> Unfortunately, I was told in personal communication with Shlomo Lambroza that the file generated for his doctoral dissertation and was coded on punch-cards had been lost. Lambroza found that more than 650 pogroms took place. The main cause for the difference between this figure and the number of towns that I linked to pogroms is that Motzkin’s report bundled together in quite a few cases a report on several minor pogroms that occurred in a certain district, without naming the locality. In such cases I tagged the district as a pogrom district, but these events were not included in measures that require an identification of a specific locality.

definitions, as well as descriptive statistics of the pogroms data, are discussed in Appendix B.

### 3.2 Descriptive Statistics

The descriptive statistics of the sample of identified immigrants are reported in Table 1. Panel A reports district-level statistics. The sample covers 215 districts, among them 208 out of the 236 district of the Pale of Settlement, and 7 districts beyond the Pale. These districts had 426 towns with migrants who were identified from the Ellis Island records of the period FY 1900–1914.<sup>35</sup> This means that on average each district is represented by almost two towns. The Jewish population in these towns covered, on average, 59 percent of the Jewish population of their districts. To the extent that Jewish migrants who came from smaller localities tended to report the nearest large town, the effective coverage rate is greater than the share of Jews living in identified towns. In the region of New-Russia, the coverage rate was the greatest, 77 percent, due to the fact that on average Jews in the south lived in larger localities. This greater coverage rate may bias upwards the measurement of Jewish migration from this region, but as discussed above, as long as the extent of this bias did not change over the sample period, the benchmark results presented in Section 5 should not be affected.

The uneven distribution of pogroms is evident. While 13 percent of the districts had at least one pogrom reported in 1881, Lithuania had none, and, with the exception of the 1881 Christmas pogrom in Warsaw, neither did Poland. The clustered pattern of the first wave can be seen on the map in Figure 5, where pogroms typically spread from cities to the surrounding countryside (Aronson 1990, Ch. 7). In the second wave of 1903–1906, half of the districts had at least one pogrom reported, and a major pogrom was recorded in 30 percent of them.<sup>36</sup> This time, however, Polish and Lithuanian districts did experience violence, albeit to a lesser degree than southern provinces (see also the map in Figure 6).<sup>37</sup>

The bottom rows of Panel A in Table 1 report the direct and indirect measures of migration. The indirect measure is generated from data on associations in the years 1861–1920, counting the number of incorporated landsmanshaftn linked to each district per year, divided by the district’s Jewish population. The direct measure of migration covers the period FY 1900–1914; it is the count of Jewish immigrants aged 16–50 in each year, adjusted for the ratio of total-to-observed migration, divided by the size of their respective cohorts as of 1897. The average year-district rate of migration was 13.4 in the first part of the period, before the second wave of pogroms (FY 1900–1905), and 14.4 per thousand in its second part after the pogroms (FY 1906–1914), but behind

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<sup>35</sup> The few districts beyond the Pale are mainly in the province of Courland, bordering the Lithuanian province of Kovno on the north. This province had formerly been part of the Pale. Although officially removed from it, many Jewish communities continued to exist there.

<sup>36</sup> See below on the definition of “major”.

<sup>37</sup> On why the provinces of Lithuania were less prone to pogroms see Staliunas (2004), Sirutavicius and Staliunas (2010), and Le Foll (2010).

these figures there was great year-to-year volatility (See Figure 1),<sup>38</sup> and as will be discussed in section 5, some districts experienced a sharp increase in migration between the two sub-periods. Even while considering that this measure is restricted to ages 16–50, this was still one of the highest rates of European U.S.-bound migration at that period.<sup>39</sup>

Panel B of Table 1 reports the demographic characteristics of the Russian migrants. The difference between Jews and non-Jews is quite stark (Columns 1 and 2), and, as already pointed out (Kuznets 1975, pp. 94–100), it characterized the Jewish migration as “family” or “permanent” migration, compared to the economically-driven migration of other ethnic groups. Jewish migrants came in larger family groups, and had much higher shares of females, children, and elderly people—groups that are less likely to become gainfully employed. Among the non-Jewish migrants the ratio of married adult males to married adult females was over three to one, suggesting that most non-Jewish married males migrated with the intention of returning. In sharp contrast, the number of adult Jewish married males and females was almost equal, consistent with an inclination to permanent migration.<sup>40</sup> The demographic composition of Jewish migration was quite consistent across regions. A minor pattern emerges with the Jewish migration from the Polish provinces being somewhat more “economic” in nature, and the migrants from New-Russia having the highest dependency ratios.

### 3.3 The Case of a Single Town: Kalarash

To get a closer look at the data, I present in Appendix C a case study describing the experience of a single Town, Kalarash (Orgieev district, Bessarabia province, New-Russia). It demonstrates what an actual deadly pogrom looked like, and shows that, at least in this extreme case, pogrom-driven migration did happen. This study partly builds on historical narrative evidence by eye witnesses, and I show how the narrative correspond to raw data and how the raw data were translated into observations in the data sets.

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<sup>38</sup> The strong sensitivity of Jewish migration to American business cycles was demonstrated in Platt Boustan (2007). In Spitzer (2015c) I show that this sensitivity is partly attributed to migrants timing their migration optimally, and not due to an exceedingly high long-run income elasticity of migration.

<sup>39</sup> Compare to Hatton and Williamson (2008, Table 4.2). Also, recall that the adjustment process should have generated, on average, a small upward bias of these counts.

<sup>40</sup> Sarna (1981) claimed that Jewish return migration was more prevalent than has been thought, but provided no quantitative evidence. Gould (1980, Table 3) showed that it was the *lowest* of all ethnicities. Recent evidence on return migration by Bandiera, Rasul, and Viarengo (2013), as well as indirect evidence by Abramitzky, Platt Boustan, and Eriksson (2014), indicate that Russia stood out as the country with the lowest rates of return migration, which given the large share of Jews among Russian immigrants is consistent with Gould’s figures. Hersch (1913) proposed an explanation to the low rates of return migration and the familial character of the Jewish migration based on the unique occupational structure of the Jewish population. He claimed that temporary migration of young men was particularly typical for agricultural workers, and thus Jews were more likely to migrate permanently and as families, simply because they were almost absent in the agricultural sector. This explanation seems unsatisfactory; although Italians were not as highly urbanized as American Jews, they still lived primarily in American cities, yet were very likely to return and repeat.

Relative to its size, Kalarash suffered in 1905 one of the worst pogroms of the Late Imperial period, with as many as one hundred murdered Jews. The pogroms left most of the residents homeless and without means to provide for themselves, as a large portion of the town was burned. There is no indication for migration coming from the region prior to the 1890s, and the town's first immigrant association in New York was founded only in 1906. I was able to count only a handful of Kalarash immigrants in each of the six years before the pogrom, but soon after it their number rose rapidly, nearly tenfold in the year after the pogrom, before dropping back down to a level that was still higher than before the pogrom (see Figure 7). In all probability, many of them were driven out by the pogrom and the economic devastation it brought, in the sense that if the pogrom had not occurred they would not have migrated. Whether Kalarash, the extreme case, epitomized the general case or was an unrepresentative odd anecdote is the question I examine in the coming sections.

## 4 Results: The First Wave of Pogroms 1881–1882

The persecution theory associated the first wave of pogroms with the onset of Jewish mass emigration from Russia. Although the existence of such a strong link is doubted by historians, the available quantitative evidence is still mixed and incomplete. The purpose of this section is to examine the relation between the first wave of pogroms and the beginning of mass migration, using new evidence on the geographic distribution of pogroms and the incorporation of landsmanshaftn.

### 4.1 Migrations Before the Pogroms

Prior to 1881 there had already been a trickle of Jewish migration from Russia.<sup>41</sup> This early flow of migration is clearly captured in the landsmanshaftn data. The map in Figure 8 marks the locations of the hometowns of landsmanshaftn that were incorporated during the years 1861–1880 in the New York County court. A very clear pattern emerges—if incorporation broadly represented the local origins of Jewish immigrants, then a very restricted set of provinces had provided the pioneering cohorts of migrants. Congress Poland was clearly the main source: practically all early landsmanshaftn originated there, a handful in Lithuania, and none in the south (see also Table 1, Panel A, Columns 3–7). Furthermore, within Poland migration was concentrated mostly in the northern provinces bordering Germany. This pattern was hitherto unknown.<sup>42</sup>

Explanations for the early migration strip pattern that are wholly based on internal economic conditions are hard to come by. As we shall see, the northern provinces of Poland continued to provide large cohorts of immigrants in subsequent decades as well, but one would be hard pressed to find causes that made conditions there so much more conducive to immigration in the 1870s compared to neighboring Lithuanian provinces, that in the following decades more than caught up with the Polish levels of migration. There are no good measures available to compare the standards of living of the Jews in northern Congress Poland with those of Jews in other regions of the northwest, but little indicates that they were particularly worse-off. In fact, the convention

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<sup>41</sup> Kuznets (1975) estimated the number of Jewish immigrants from the Russian empire during the 1870s at 15–20 thousand, as opposed to 139.5 thousand during the 1880s. Diner (1995) claimed the migration had been building up since the 1860s and 1870s, and Alroey (2008) reported figures suggesting Kuznets had under-estimated the volume of earlier migration.

<sup>42</sup> In fact, a rather detailed guess by Jacob Lestschinsky (1961), a prominent scholar who spent much of his life studying Jewish demographics and migration, on the geographic origins of pre-pogroms migration, had it that the pioneers of the Jewish-Russian immigration were Lithuanian Jews fleeing the famine of the late 1860s: “[...] most of the residents in the Jewish quarters of New York and Chicago in this decade [1870s] were Lithuanians. [...] The number of Polish Jews was at first not very great” (p. 68). To be fair, the province of Suwalki, that was administratively part of Congress Poland and appeared to have been one of the main sources of early immigration, was in fact “Lithuanian” in the terms of the cultural geography of the Pale. Its immigrants would have probably been identified as true “Litvaks”. However, Lestschinsky was specifically referring to the 1869 Kovno famine as the driver of early Lithuanian migration (p. 54; also, see more on the Kovno famine below), yet the province of Kovno itself was clearly a late-comer. Later attempts to identify the geographic origins of the Jewish-Russian migration failed to pick up this early pattern reported here because they relied on post-1900 evidence (Perlmann 2006), or evidence bundling the pre- and post-1900 periods (Stampfer 1986).

in the historical literature that the Lithuanian provinces of Grodno, Kovno and Vilna were the epitome of Jewish-Russian poverty.<sup>43</sup>

Neither is there a strong case for attributing the geographic distribution of early migration to transformative processes of industrialization or urbanization, as implied by [Kuznets's \(1975\)](#) hypothesis. Early migration did not come particularly from the large urban and industrial centers of the northwest. Lodz (“Polish Manchester”), the Pale’s third largest Jewish urban community in 1897, did not incorporate an association in New York until 1888. Bialystock, another very large center of Jewish industrial labor in the province of Grodno, had two landsmanshaftn prior to 1881, as did Warsaw, the world’s largest Jewish urban center at the time. Vilna and Minsk, the Pale’s fourth and sixth largest Jewish urban communities, had one each. In contrast, all the remaining 42 pre-1881 landsmanshaftn were founded by communities of under 10 thousand Jews (as of 1897), 33 of them by communities under 5 thousand, and many of these founded more than one association.

Moreover, if one would look for a local economic shock driving migration from particular areas during the 1870s, the immediate suspect would be the Kovno famine of 1869, mentioned above. This event gained the attention of western Jewish communities and reports on thousands of casualties and refugees led to the founding of a relief committee that eventually directed and supported several hundred Jewish refugees in migration to the U.S.<sup>44</sup> However, communities from the province of Kovno had founded only a single landsmanshaft prior to 1881. While the province of Suwalki was also hit by this famine, and did indeed produce a large number of associations, other northern-Polish provinces were not mentioned as suffering famine. In other words, the famine crisis may have induced many Suwalki Jews to emigrate, but could not have been the crucial difference explaining why the early migration came from northern-Poland and not from western-Lithuania.

Proximity to the border could have played a role in facilitating the migration from border provinces, simply by reducing the costs of travel within Russia en route to the German ports, from which many of the immigrants eventually embarked. Undoubtedly the costs of travel toward the border were burdensome, probably reducing the benefits of migration on the margin, but they could not have been a bottleneck preventing migration from regions further from the border: As we shall see below, provinces that were far from the border did produce mass emigration soon after.<sup>45</sup>

The possibility that the early pattern of migration was generated by the expansion of railways in Russia must be considered carefully.<sup>46</sup> In 1869, the St. Petersburg-Warsaw line was completed, and by that time some of its branches had been operating for a few years. It crossed Congress

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<sup>43</sup> For a classical study on the condition of Jewish workers in these provinces see [Mendelsohn \(1970\)](#).

<sup>44</sup> On this episode see [Wischnitzer \(1948, pp. 28–36\)](#), who saw in it the first organized migration that opened the door to subsequent chain migration.

<sup>45</sup> According to [Alroey \(2008, p. 116, Table 19\)](#), the cost of travel to the border was on average one fifth of the ship fare.

<sup>46</sup> The possibility of a relation between the spread of Russian railway and the geographic sources of Jewish emigration was noted by [Brinkmann \(2013, p. 6\)](#).

Poland from the north-east to the southwest, and importantly, it had two links to the Prussian railway system: one in Suwalki province, at the north-east of Poland, another at the northwest. Most pre-1881 migrants probably crossed the German border through or around (when crossing illegally) these railway border points on their way to Hamburg, Bremen, and other Atlantic ports.<sup>47</sup> The St. Petersburg-Warsaw line must have been easily accessible from all places along the early migration strip, and certainly facilitated migration from these areas.

However, other places were linked to this line as well. In particular, it crossed the major cities of Vilna and Grodno, and an early branch that went from Vilna to the German border in Suwalki crossed through Kovno. The city of Minsk was a short distance away from the line, connected via a major road. So the would-be greatest migration sources of western-Lithuania were linked by the railway at the same time as the early migration strip, and proximity to railway is not a crucial difference explaining why the latter regions had migration prior to 1881 whereas the former did not. Furthermore, within a few years the railways reached the south too. By 1875, the southwest provinces of Volhinia and Podolia, as well as the urban centers of Kishinev, Odessa, and Kiev, were all linked by train to Hamburg via the Austrian railway system, but migration did not follow until years later. The Brody refugees of the 1881 pogroms used these lines to reach the Austrian border, making it evident that arriving at the border was rather the easier part of the migration challenge. Most of them failed to migrate because they had no personal relations with former migrants to rely on, and they were left depending on charity and assistance by organizations.

In fact, Russian Jews migrated over great distances within the Pale throughout the nineteenth century. By 1897 there were more than 700 thousand Jewish residents in New-Russia, where hardly any Jewish settlement had existed a century earlier. Most of them were probably immigrants or descendants of immigrants from Lithuania, and many of these migrations took place decades before railways were available anywhere in Russia.<sup>48</sup>

Instead, a plausible explanation for this pattern is that the previous existence of migration networks was effectively a necessary condition for migration, and that these networks took time to diffuse across regions. Consistent with [Gould's \(1980\)](#) hypothesis on the European pattern of migration (see also [Baines 1995](#))[Moya1998](#), these networks had only started to filter during the 1860s and 1870s through the German border, where the overseas migration of the neighboring formerly-Polish, now-Prussian, Jews from the provinces of East-Prussia, West-Prussia, and mainly Posen, had already been well established during the third quarter of the nineteenth century ([Diner 1995](#)). Russian Jews living in proximity to the German border maintained contacts across the border, and thus became the first to migrate from within the Pale ([Leiserowitz 2009](#)).<sup>49</sup> While positive

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<sup>47</sup> On the border crossing see [Alroey \(2008, pp. 150–162\)](#).

<sup>48</sup> On internal Jewish migration within the Pale see [Stampfer \(1995\)](#). On the Jewish community of Odessa, including details on the demographic evolution through the nineteenth century, see [Zipperstein \(1985\)](#). On general internal migration in the Russian Empire see [Anderson \(1980\)](#).

<sup>49</sup> The Jewish trade across the German border, often illegal, was a persistent worry for the Russians throughout the nineteenth century. To curb Jewish smuggling activity, a series of orders going back at least to 1825 ([Klier 1986](#),

proof for this assertion requires further micro-historical study, the early migration strip pattern and further evidence presented below are consistent with it. On the other hand, explanations that attribute the patterns of Jewish migration to internal economic and demographic conditions alone are insufficient.<sup>50</sup>

This view is supported by statistics on the immigrants' relations to persons already living in the U.S. in the years 1908–1914. Of a sample of 656 Jewish immigrants, 62.2 percent reported that their ticket was paid by a relative or another person. 94.2 percent reported that they were joining a relative, and 4 percent reported joining a friend. The rest, 1.8 percent, reported that they were not joining anyone (Kuznets 1975, Table XIII).<sup>51</sup>

## 4.2 Post-1881 Migration

The maps on Figure 9 show the 1881 pogroms and landsmanshaftn incorporated during the following decade. The lack of geographic overlap between the two areas is so stark that no further statistical evidence is required: The post-1881 migrants did not come from areas that had experienced pogroms. Instead, the migration that immediately followed the pogroms was a rather smooth continuation and expansion of previous trends, where the neighboring western-Lithuanian provinces of Kovno, Vilnia, Grodno, and Minsk, were contracting emigration. The handful of pioneering southern landsmanshaftn was an exception rather than the rule.<sup>52</sup> It was only later during the 1890s and early 1900s that evidence of large scale emigration appeared in the south (Figure 11), mainly from the southwestern provinces of Volhinia, Podolia, and Kiev, but even then not necessarily from places that had experienced pogroms. Over all, the rate of landsmanshaft incorporation during the entire period 1882–1905 was around four times greater in Poland and Lithuania compared to the pogrom-stricken south (Table 1, Panel A).

The evidence does not rule out that the 1881 pogroms, and more broadly the intensification in persecution, induced migration. There could have been a country-wide effect on the intention to migrate, including on that of Jews living in the northwest. The pogrom victims in the south may have received a very strong incentive to migrate to the U.S., but not having been linked to a chain

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p. 168), and culminating with an imperial edict in 1843, were issued banning Jewish settlement at a distance of less than 50 versts (53 km.) from the German and Austrian borders. These were later interpreted as a ban on new settlement only, and were hardly ever enforced in practice. For a case study on a Suwalki border town, its trade relations in Germany and the way they fostered migration, see Leiserowitz (2006).

<sup>50</sup> For evidence on the importance of local chain migration in the case of the German migration from Hesse-Cassel, see Wegge (1998); on chain migration in the European transatlantic migration in general see Hatton and Williamson (1998). Similar evidence on contemporary migration was presented by Munshi (2003), and McKenzie and Rapoport (2010).

<sup>51</sup> The evidence on the share of linked passengers should be taken with caution; it may be that by 1908 the networks were already well saturated, such that almost every prospective migrant could name a relative or a friend in America upon arrival to the U.S. port of entry, whether his arrival depended on this link or not.

<sup>52</sup> As above, Lestschinsky's (1961) speculation turns out to be incorrect: "The pogroms of the 1880s brought mostly Ukrainian Jews" (p. 68). The southwest and New-Russia regions were roughly equivalent to the Ukrainian territories of the Russian Empire.

of migration, they did not have the opportunity to respond to these incentives. The Brody Episode is a perfect demonstration of this case, where thousands of victims directly affected by pogroms wanted to become migrants but were not able to do so without assistance. Nevertheless, there is little in the data indicating 1881 as a country-wide turning point. The increase in the volume of migration around that time could be regarded as a natural continuation of the process that had budded during the 1870s. This increase might have occurred even if the pogroms had never happened. The rising numbers of migrants during the 1880s, compared with the previous decade, may well be attributed to a geographic expansion of the migration base rather than to an increase in the rate of migration in the already exposed districts.

## 5 Results: The Second Wave of Pogroms 1903–1906

If there was a local effect of pogroms, it should have been apparent following the second wave of pogroms (1903–1906), when most regions had already experienced emigration to some degree, and moving to the U.S. had entered the choice set of victims. In this section I use the data on pogroms and migration around the second wave to test whether pogroms had a local effect on subsequent migration. The benchmark analysis uses a difference-in-differences (DID) specification with observations at the year-district level, where the treatment is defined as a district-level indicator for having experienced at least one pogrom.

### 5.1 Regional Patterns

The maps on Figure 13 plot the 1903–1906 pogroms alongside the landsmanshaftn incorporated during the following decade, and reveal a more mixed pattern.<sup>53</sup> Pogroms became more widespread, reaching Poland and the eastern provinces of Lithuania, as well as previously peaceful areas in the south, such as Bessarabia and northern Chernigov province. Nevertheless, the south again took a greater hit: 89 percent and 70 percent of the districts of New-Russia and the southwest were affected by a pogrom, compared with 55 percent and 22 percent in Lithuania and Poland (see Table 1, Panel A, Columns 3-6).

The post-1906 landsmanshaftn build-up was still stronger in Poland and Lithuania, but the southwest was experiencing a formidable increase of over 80 percent in 1906–1920 relative to the previous 25 years. While the average rates of northern emigration during 1906–1914 slightly declined relative to 1900–1905, emigration from the southwest increased by more than 70 percent and surpassed those of Poland with 14.46 migrants per 1,000. Interestingly, emigration from the region that was hardest-hit, New-Russia, seemed to have remained the lowest with a smaller post-pogroms increase than the southwest.

### 5.2 The Determinants of Pogroms

Pogroms were by no means randomly assigned.<sup>54</sup> Since the benchmark specification is DID, the main danger to identification would be if the allocation of pogroms was correlated with differential

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<sup>53</sup> On this period I already have direct migration data from Ellis Island; the maps show landsmanshaftn instead of actual migration measures in order to facilitate comparability to the previous maps.

<sup>54</sup> Voigtländer and Voth (2012) showed that antisemitic activity in German cities during the Weimar and Third-Reich period was correlated with the occurrence of anti-Jewish riots during the Black-Death almost six centuries earlier, a pattern consistent with persistent town-level variation in anti-Semitic tendencies. In a study on the determinants of the expulsions of Jewish communities during Late Middle-Ages and the Early Modern Europe, Anderson, Johnson, and Koyama (2013) found that prior to 1600, expulsions were much more likely to occur during years of cold weather shocks. See also Jha (2013), on the determinants of local inter-ethnic violence in Indian port cities.

trends in migration. Suppose, for example, that pogroms were more likely to occur in districts that came late to emigration but were catching up. Then these districts would have experienced rising trends relative to other districts regardless of the pogroms. Such a pattern would cause a correlation between pogroms and the rise in the rate of migration, biasing the estimates toward finding a more positive relation than the actual causal effect of the pogrom. In Section 5.3 I show that such convergence indeed occurred on a massive scale, and therefore it is crucial to ascertain that it does not affect the results.

Table 2 reports OLS district-level regressions of pogroms on possible determinants, according to

$$z_d = \beta x_d + \theta_r + \epsilon_d, \tag{1}$$

where  $z_d$  is an indicator for at least one pogrom occurring in district  $d$  during the second wave;  $\theta_r$  is region (or province) fixed-effects; and  $x_d$  is a vector of district characteristics, including an indicator for at least one pogrom occurring in the district in 1881, as well as measures of migration prior to the second wave.

There is a strong unconditional correlation between having experienced at least one pogrom in 1881 and experiencing one in 1903–1906 (Column 1), reflecting the fact that the first wave occurred only in the south, and the second mostly there as well. However, this correlation is all but wiped out when the regional fixed-effects are added (Column 2): within regions, a 1881 pogrom does not help to predict pogroms in the second wave.

Column 3 adds district characteristics to the control variables predicting pogroms. Three of the control variables represent previous migration: one based on Ellis Island counts from FY 1900–1905, and two based on landsmanshaftn measures from before the first wave of pogroms (1861–1881), and from between the first wave and the beginning of Ellis Island counts (1882–1899). The rate of landsmanshaft incorporation (per 100,000 Jews in the district, per year) is estimated to have had a negative effect during both 1861–1881 and 1882–1899, but only in the latter period it is (marginally) statistically significant. The coefficient of -0.069 implies that a district that had a one standard deviation (0.936) greater rate of incorporation in 1882–1899, had a 6.46 percentage points lower probability to experience a pogrom during the second wave. This could be a concerning indication, but importantly, there does not seem to be any correlation at all between total FY 1900–1905 emigration and the probability to suffer a pogrom. The coefficient on the log of prior migration is 0.006, meaning that a 10 percent greater emigration in 1900–1905 is associated with a minuscule 0.06 percentage points greater probability for pogroms, and it is statistically insignificant. Thus, the concern of mistakenly interpreting convergence in migration rates across districts with the effects of pogrom on subsequent migration is unfounded. Within regions, second-wave pogrom-districts were not associated with different rates of migration during the six previous years. Further detailed evidence presented below on convergence strongly reinforces this conclusion.

One might suspect that using a pogrom-district indicator is not a perfect measure of treatment. Indeed, in some provinces all, or almost all, districts were hit in 1905 by at least one pogrom, and useful information may be lost by equally tagging all of these cases as pogroms. Table 3 repeats the analysis in Table 2, but with a higher threshold: districts are tagged as pogrom-districts only if they experienced at least one major pogrom in 1903–1906, where a pogrom is defined as major if one of the two sources specifically reported that it had at least either large damage or wounded persons.<sup>55</sup> As reported in Table 1, 30 percent of the districts experienced a major pogrom, with the regional rates varying between 11 percent in Poland and 74 percent in New-Russia. Overall, the pattern is identical to the one seen above when tagging any pogroms regardless of severity. There is one exception, in that the effect of 1881 pogroms becomes larger and marginally significant. But importantly, the estimates of the effects of migration in the previous six years are practically zero.

Table 3 reports similar regressions as in the previous two tables, but the dependent variable is pogroms per capita (per 100 thousand Jews in the district), enabling a consideration of the intensive margin. The average district rate of pogroms per capita was 6.1 pogroms per 100 thousand Jews, with a standard deviation of 10.6. This time, the 1881 pogroms are marginally significant, but negative. In the controlled specification (Column 3), migration in 1900–1905 is statistically significantly associated with lower rates of pogroms: 10 percent more migration is correlated with 0.188 fewer pogroms per 100 thousand, a magnitude equivalent to 0.018 standard deviations only. But even this effect is diminished by three-quarters and becomes statistically insignificant as province fixed-effects are added (Column 4).

To summarize, it is clear that pogroms were correlated with some district characteristics. These correlations mostly become statistically and economically insignificant when controlling for region and province fixed-effects. However, there does not seem to be a consistent pattern of correlation between migration in the years 1900–1905 and the distribution of pogroms. This somewhat alleviates the main threat for identification, that of mistaking convergence in migration with the pogrom effect.

### 5.3 Differences in Migration After Pogroms

The core findings regarding the second wave of pogroms are all apparent in the plot on Figure 15. Each observation in this plot is a single district. Each district’s average yearly rate of migration per capita for the pre-pogrom years FY 1900–1905, counted from the Ellis Island arrival records (and adjusted for the ratio of official-to-observed migration), is represented by the horizontal axis. The vertical axis represents the rate of increase in the average yearly migration during the post-pogrom period (FY 1906–1914), relative to the previous six years.

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<sup>55</sup> A large damage is defined as more than 100 families affected *or* more than 500 persons affected *or* damage greater than 20 thousand Ruble.

First, during the pre-pogrom years there was a very wide variation in levels of migration across districts.<sup>56</sup> This variation might be suspected to be partly attributed to variations in effective coverage rates (the ratio of population in towns from which migration was counted to the total Jewish population in the district). The two variables are indeed strongly correlated,<sup>57</sup> not surprisingly suggesting that greater coverage leads to more migration counts. But attempting to control for coverage hardly reduces the variation.<sup>58</sup> Second, there appears to have been a sharp pattern of convergence in the rates of migration. Migration from districts that lagged behind during 1900–1906 was growing much faster than in other districts, and by no small margin.<sup>59</sup> The conclusion is that above all, the change in migration is governed by a process of convergence; the first order predictor of rates of increase in migration is, by and large, the rate of previous migration.

There is one caveat related to this evidence on convergence. Regressing the difference in migration on the level of migration prior to the pogroms runs the risk that measurement errors in the level of migration before the pogroms would mechanically bias down the correlation.<sup>60</sup> In other words, the negative correlation between pre-pogrom migration and post-pogroms change in migration could be a spurious result of random measurement errors. However, it does not seem likely that this mechanical bias is the main cause for the convergence patterns. First, the variation in pre-pogrom migration is just too large for more than a small fraction of it to be caused by measurement errors that are not common to both the pre- and post-pogrom period.<sup>61</sup> Second, if the negative correlation

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<sup>56</sup> The 25th percentile of average pre-pogrom migration is merely 3.02 migrants per thousand (in ages 16–50), whereas the 75th percentile is almost five times greater (14.15 migrants per thousand). The mean (13.01) is 70 percent greater than the median (7.68), and the standard deviation of log average yearly migration is 1.16, implying that one standard deviation greater migration translates to an increase of 216 percent.

<sup>57</sup> The coefficient of correlation is  $\rho = 0.407$ , and the coefficient from a univariate regression of log migration on coverage rate is  $\hat{\beta} = 2.37$ , significant at a confidence level of 1%. Eight outlying districts with coverage rates exceeding 1.2 were removed; these are districts that had an unusually large proportion of Jews whose mother tongue was not Yiddish (the towns population counts Jews defined by religion, whereas the district population counts Jews according to mother tongue, such that in rare cases the Jewish population of towns within the district could exceed the total Jewish population in the district).

<sup>58</sup> A regression of log average pre-pogrom migration per capita on coverage rates has an R-squared of only 0.166. When creating an adjusted measure of migration, by inflating migration counts by multiplication with the inverse of the coverage rates, the adjusted measure has a standard deviation of 1.03, a decrease slightly greater than one-tenth compared with the unadjusted measure (as above, the analysis excluded outliers).

<sup>59</sup> The coefficient of correlation between pre-pogrom log migration and the difference in log migration between pre- and post-pogroms migration is  $\rho = -0.70$  ( $\hat{\beta} = -0.38$ , significant at 1%). Among the top quartile of pre-pogrom migrations, the rate of migration did not increase. Their average difference in log migration was in fact negative,  $-0.08$  (equivalent to a decline of 7 percent). In the next quartile, there was an average positive increase of 0.34 log points (an increase of 40 percent), and a difference of 0.59 log points in the third highest quartile (80 percent). At the bottom quartile of pre-pogrom migration, the average change was of 0.93 log points, equivalent to 154 percent increased migration. In fact, there is almost no overlap between the rates of growth in the top and in the bottom quartiles—87 percent of the districts in the top quartile of pre-pogrom migration had migration increase of less than half, whereas 80 percent of the districts in the bottom quartile had growth *greater* than half.

<sup>60</sup> This would happen because any error would enter in opposite signs both in the level before and in the difference between before and after.

<sup>61</sup> Sources of measurement errors such as less than full coverage or inaccurate text conditions should affect both periods equally, and thus would not produce a mechanical bias.

is entirely caused by the measurement error bias, then there should be a *positive* and similarly sized correlation between the change in migration and migration *after* the pogroms. This, however, is not the case. In fact, the correlation between these two variable is also negative. It is closer to zero, which is consistent with a pattern of convergence in migration rates. Further evidence consistent with convergence is apparent in Figure 16, showing that the standard deviation in log yearly rates of migration per capita across districts had a consistent and almost monotone secular trend of decline over the entire period FY 1900–1914.

Importantly, Figure 15 provides strong clues on the effects of pogroms, pointing to a meaningful effect of pogroms on migration. The districts that had at least one pogrom (according to the most inclusive definition), are plotted separately from other districts. On average, pogrom-districts had a post-pogroms increase in migration of 0.60 log points (equivalent to 81 percent), whereas no-pogrom districts had an average growth of only 0.29 log points (34 percent). The implied difference-in-differences effect is 0.30 log points, or 36 percent more migration attributed to the pogroms. This effect does not seem to be driven by the convergence process. The curves on the plot represent the separate kernel regression for pogrom- and no-pogrom-districts, and show that across almost the entire range of pre-pogrom migration, the increase in migration in pogrom-districts is uniformly greater.

Table 5 shows this more formally in a differences regression. The specification in these regressions are based on the following equation:

$$\Delta \log \bar{m}_d = \alpha + \beta z_d + \gamma x_d + \epsilon_t, \quad (2)$$

where  $z_d$  is an indicator for a in district  $d$ , and  $x_d$  is a vector of district characteristics, which may also include pre-pogrom migration or province fixed-effects. The outcome is  $\Delta \log \bar{m}_d = \log(\bar{m}_d^{\text{after}}/\bar{m}_d^{\text{before}})$ , the difference in log yearly average rate of migration per capita. Column 1 repeats the uncontrolled comparison stated above: the 0.30 log point greater increase in migration in pogrom-districts is indeed statistically significant at 1%. Column 2 adds controls for the rate of coverage and pre-pogrom migration. As discussed above, there appears to have been both statistically and economically significant convergence, with a coefficient of  $-0.40$ , implying that a standard deviation less log pre-pogrom migration (1.16) is associated with 0.465 log points (59 percent) greater increase in post-pogrom migration. The effect of the pogroms is somewhat weakened, but is still strong and significant (0.23 log points).

In Column 3, the pogrom effect is divided by the four quartiles of pre-pogrom migration. The coefficients confirm the impression made by the kernel regressions on Figure 15: the pogrom effect is not driven by convergence in rates of migration. On the contrary, the estimated pogrom effect is greater in each subsequent quartile, rising from 0.11 log points (not statistically significant) in the lowest quartile, up to 0.30 (significant at 1%) in the top pre-pogrom migration quartile. Adding controls of additional district characteristics in Column 4 and province fixed-effects in Column

5 further reduces the pogrom effect, but leaves it both economically and statistically significant. With province fixed-effects, the estimated difference attributed to the pogroms is 0.16 log points (17 percent).

To summarize the main findings of this discussion, the qualitative conclusions thus far are the following: (a) There was a very large variation in pre-pogrom migration counts across districts; (b) convergence in migration rates across districts was the primary cause for post-pogroms increase in migration; (c) there appears to have been a positive economically and statistically significant pogrom effect; and (d) the pogrom effect was not driven by convergence, instead, it was uniform (or even increasing) with respect to pre-pogrom migration. The next subsection follows these finding by presenting the benchmark DID analysis.

#### 5.4 DID Effect of Pogroms on Migration

Table 6 reports a series of DID regressions over district-years, that estimate the causal effect of pogroms on the district’s log migration per capita. First, Column 1 reports a plain regression of migration on a district-level pogrom indicator, comparing pogrom districts with non-pogrom districts:

$$\log m_{dt} = \alpha + \beta z_d + \epsilon_{dt}, \quad (3)$$

where  $m_{dt}$  is migration per thousand within the cohorts aged 16–50, adjusted for the share of observed-to-total migration; and  $z_d$  is an indicator for any pogrom (of any severity) identified in the district during the second wave. Surprisingly, although at the regional level the correlation between pogroms and migration is negative, with southern regions having more pogroms and less migration, pogrom-districts did not produced less migration than other districts over the period 1900–1914.

Column 2 reports a basic uncontrolled DID regression of migration on pogroms, according to

$$\log m_{dt} = \alpha + \delta(z_d \times \text{After}_t) + \beta z_d + \gamma \text{After}_t + \epsilon_{dt}, \quad (4)$$

where  $\text{After}_t$  is an indicator for years the pogroms (1906 and later),<sup>62</sup> and  $\delta$  is the parameter capturing the pogrom DID effect. The estimated effect is large and statistically significant, suggesting that post-pogrom migration was 0.358 log points greater in pogrom districts. The pre-pogroms difference in migration is negative (−0.148 log points, although statistically insignificant), suggesting that the near equality shown in Column 1 of migration from pogrom and non-pogrom districts, is a result of averaging a pre-pogrom negative difference with post-pogrom positive difference. Two rows at the bottom of the table calculate the weighted predicted pogrom effect, the rate of increase in the prediction of total migration between a no-pogroms scenario to migration predicted under

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<sup>62</sup> After is indicated in 1904 (1905) and later years for pogroms that took place in 1903 (1904).

the actual pogrom allocation.<sup>63</sup> The predicted treatment effect on the treated districts only is a total of 43 percent greater migration in the post-pogrom period attributed to the pogroms.

The regression in Column 3 adds district characteristics, year-dummies, and province fixed-effects. The estimated coefficient decreases to 0.302 log points (significant at 1%), whereas the predicted treatment effect on the treated districts is 35.2 percent (25.8 percent for all districts). As expected, the coverage rate is strongly associated with counting more migration, and capital districts are also correlated with more migration, which could be related either to the potential for upward estimation of migration from districts that had the same name as their province, or to a greater tendency of urban cohorts to migrate.

The specification of the regression reported in Column 4, to which I refer as the benchmark specification, replaces the province fixed-effects and district controls with district fixed-effects, and adds year-region dummies that enable non-parametric regional trends:

$$\log m_{dt} = \delta(z_d \times \text{After}_t) + \eta_d + \theta_{rt} + \epsilon_{dt}, \quad (5)$$

The pogrom effect is yet again somewhat weakened, but it is still economically and statistically significant—pogrom-districts had a post-pogrom effect of 0.223 log points, which translates to a weighted increase of 24.9 percent in migration from affected districts (17.6 percent increase in migration from all districts) over the nine years following the second wave. The fact that the pogrom effect remains after adding district fixed-effects suggests that there is little reason to suspect that it is a result of a correlation between pogroms and time-invariant unobservable district characteristics that may independently cause migration. Controlling for the regional non-parametric time trends helps removing the threat that the effect is driven by the convergence process that was described above.

The last regression on Column 5 is based on an “overkill” specification, repeating the specification in equation 5 while replacing the region-year indicators with a set of 390 ( $= 15 \times 26$ ) province-year dummies. To the extent that there were within-province spill-over effects of pogroms, the estimated pogrom effect is downward biased. In this conservative specification, the estimated effect decreases by a third to 0.154 log points, with predicted treatment effects of 16.7 percent (treated districts) and 11.6 percent (all districts), and it is significant only at 10%, although still, arguably, economically significant.

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<sup>63</sup> That is,  $\widehat{\text{TE}} = \frac{\hat{M} - \hat{M}'}{\hat{M}'}$ , where  $\hat{M} = \sum_{\{d \in \mathcal{D}, t \geq 1906\}} \hat{m}_{dt}$  is the predicted number of migrants in the years after the pogroms under the actual realization of pogroms, and  $\hat{M}' = \sum_{\{d \in \mathcal{D}, t \geq 1906\}} \hat{m}_{dt, z_d=0}$  is the predicted number of migrants in the years after the pogroms, under a no-pogrom scenario.

## 5.5 Alternative Treatment Measures

As discussed above, the identification of the pogrom treatment-effect when the treatment is a district-level pogrom indicator is derived from the extensive margin. These specifications do not take into account variations in the intensity of the pogrom experience within districts that had at least one pogrom. Since the pogroms were so ubiquitous in the south with few districts unharmed, one might suspect that using pogrom indicators suppresses the identifying power of pogroms that took place in this region, and that the identification is mainly derived from events at the pogrom periphery. Using an alternative treatment definition of pogroms per capita enables to derive identification from the intensive margin as well. Table 7 repeats the same DID regressions as above in Table 6, while using pogroms per capita (per 100,000 Jews in the district) as the treatment of choice. Column 1 of Table 7 shows that districts that had more pogroms per capita had significantly less migration over the entire period. The statistically significant coefficient (-0.021) implies that a one standard deviation increase in pogroms per capita (10.60) translates to 0.18 standard deviations less migration during 1900–1914.<sup>64</sup> Unlike Column 1 in Table 6, this is consistent with the regional variation, that more pogroms took place in the south, where the overall rates of migration were lower. The next four columns (2–5) all predict a weighted treatment effect on the treated hovering around 10 percent, lower than predicted by the pogrom indicator treatment measure. The baseline specification (Column 4) is significant only at the 10% level, and the overkill specification is not statistically significant, while the point estimate of 7.9 percent treatment effect on the treated is smaller, but not negligible.

Alternatively, the treatment could be restricted to include only pogroms above a certain threshold of known damage. In Table 8, the same regressions are repeated using major pogrom indicators as the treatment variable. This specification is meant to test whether the estimated treatment effect is sensitive to removing the less significant cases. The specifications that do not control for district fixed-effects (Columns 2 and 3) still predict a rather large treatment effect on the treated (34 and 27.2 percent greater migration), but the baseline and overkill specifications are no longer statistically significant, although the predicted treatment effect is still meaningful (14.6 and 9.4 percent). Table 9 reports regressions using major pogroms per capita as the treatment. Despite the fact that only half of the pogroms were major, the results are qualitatively similar to those when using any pogrom per capita as the treatment: a treatment effect on the treated of around 10 percent, with only the overkill specification not significant at 5%. The fact that the total estimated treatment effect on the treated did not change in magnitude, despite removing the less-significant half of the pogroms, is consistent with an effect that increases with the magnitude of the pogrom: major pogroms probably generated more migrants than minor pogroms.

To conclude, perturbing the treatment effect does not appear to produce a meaningful qualitative difference. The estimated treatment effect on the treated is on the order of 5–20 percent greater

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<sup>64</sup> This is  $\hat{\beta} \times \text{sd}(z_d) / \text{sd}(\log m_{dt}) = -0.021 \times 10.60 / 1.26 = -0.18$ .

migration over the nine post-pogrom years. The overkill specification often falls below the threshold of statistical significance, but the point estimate is qualitatively similar, if somewhat lower, compared to other specifications. Considering the potential for spill-over effects of pogroms across districts within provinces, meaning that prospective migrants were likely to be driven to migration by pogroms that took place in neighboring districts, and not only by pogroms that took place in their own districts, the estimated effect should stand as a lower bound to the actual marginal effects of pogroms.

## 6 Extensions

### 6.1 Pogroms and Demographic Composition

The claim that the Jewish migration was pogrom- or persecution-driven is supported by its observed peculiar demographic composition—a large proportion of non-labor force participants is regarded as a sign that the intention is resettlement and that the lure of the American labor market was not the only factor inducing migration. But was the demographic composition indeed sensitive to pogroms? We can test that at the local level, by estimating the differences in the changes in demographics of migrants between pogrom-districts and non-pogrom-districts. In other words, was there a differential trend towards more permanent migration in districts that suffered violence?

Table 10 addresses this question by reporting the results of a set of DID regressions of demographic characteristics on pogroms, using equivalent specifications to those in Tables 12 and 13. In all specifications, all the coefficients with the exception of the share of elderly people, have the expected sign, consistent with the hypothesis that pogroms make the migration look more “permanent”. For example, in the baseline specification (Column 2) the estimate of the effect of pogrom on the share of females is an increase of 3 percentage points in their share among all migrants; the estimates for the effect on the share of children, adult females, and on the household size, are all positive, and the estimated effects on the share of adult males and the share of married males-to-females are negative. But almost all the coefficients are statistically insignificant, and their magnitudes are by no means spectacular. A likely scenario is that there was some local effect on the composition of migrants, but that the pogroms did not produce distinct local flows of immigrants that look like refugees in the following years. Unfortunately, the standard errors of the estimates are too large to rule out that such small effects did not exist.

Neither was there a dramatic Pale-wide change in the demographic composition of the Jewish migrants following the second wave of pogroms. Table 11, Panel A, reports average demographics of all Jewish-Russian migrants by periods. Comparing FY 1898–1904 (Column 1) with FY 1906–1914 (Column 3), there does seem to be an increase in the share of females, which went up by 4 percentage points, and a decline in the ratio of married males to married females. But other indicators such as the number of children and the size of the average household remained unchanged.

However, Table 11 also shows that the demographic composition *was* sensitive to political events other than the second wave of pogroms. First, Column 4 reports the post-WWI migration. As Kuznets (1975, p. 99) already noted, this was a truly “refugee or relief immigration”, with almost 60 percent females, an average household size of 2.9 aboard the ship, and a ratio of 0.41 married males to married females(!). No doubt, this was largely a reunion migration of household members who were cut off from their migrating breadwinners due to the turmoils of WWI and the revolutionary period. It is also possible that many of these migrants were driven out as entire households by the revolution and particularly the 1919–1921 pogroms of the revolutionary wars, that were far more

devastating than the previous two waves.

A second finding is that FY 1905 was dramatically exceptional. In particular, the share of adult males went up to 51.9 percent, compared to 38.6 percent before and 34.5 percent after; the ratio of married males to married female rose to roughly double its regular level; the average size of migrating household went down; and the share of all groups other than adult males declined. No such pattern appears in other years (except, to a smaller extent, in FY 1904), and no equivalent trend characterizes the non-Jewish migration (Panel B.). In all likelihood, this reflects the flight of thousands of young adult Jewish males from conscription to the army in view of the 1904–1905 Russo-Japanese war by migration to the U.S.<sup>65</sup>

According to the official figures there were 92,388 Jewish-Russian immigrants during FY 1905. Assuming that absent the war the share of adult Jewish males would have remained the same as in the previous seven years, as many as additional 20 thousand adult male immigrants can be regarded as wartime migrants avoiding conscription during that year. To the extent that some of the immigrants pushed by the prospects of conscription were joined by members of their families who were not adult males, this estimate should be regarded as a lower bound.

Beyond the interest of these particular episodes, the lesson from the cases of the Russo-Japanese war and the post-WWI years is the following: when Russian-Jews migrated as refugees, this is reflected in the data through changes in their demographic composition. Indeed, it can not be ruled out that the pogroms had some composition effect, or that over the entire period the peculiar demographic patterns of the Jewish migration could be partly attributed to repression and the prospects of violence and persecution.<sup>66</sup> But as far as the demographic composition is concerned, the second wave of pogroms was no turning point - neither in the country as a whole nor in the affected districts.

## 6.2 Heterogenous Effects

The estimates presented in the previous section assume that the effects of the pogroms were uniform, both across space and over the post-pogrom period. However, one may suspect that this may not be the case. For example, it could be that the effect of the pogroms was stronger in regions in which more districts were hurt, or that it varied with standards of living. Also, if the pogroms were a temporary shock that subsided within a few years, as local Jewish communities realized it might have been a one-off event, then the effect should decline over time.

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<sup>65</sup> The war lasted from February 1904 to September 1905, spanning the later part of FY 1904, the entire FY 1905, and the beginning of FY 1906. On the conscription of Jews to the war see Petrovsky-Shtern (2008, Ch. 6).

<sup>66</sup> In future versions of this paper, this question will be addressed by comparing Russian-Jews to Austrian-Jews migrating from Galicia.

### 6.2.1 Region-Specific Effects

Table 12 tests for region-specific effects, by adding to the last three specifications of Table 3 a region-specific DID term. Unfortunately, the patterns are not perfectly consistent across specifications, and therefore it is hard to take away a clear conclusion from this exercise. The baseline specification (Column 2), indicates that the pogrom effect was the strongest in Lithuania (0.512 log points, or 66.9 percent), and non-existing in Poland and New-Russia. It is hard to rationalize this pattern, and furthermore, the more basic specification in Column 1 estimates an equally strong effect in both Lithuania and New-Russia, while the “overkill” specification (Column 3) has New-Russia with the strongest effect, although statistically insignificant.

### 6.2.2 Year-Specific Effects

Table 13 reports a similar exercise, in which the pogrom effects are separated by years.<sup>67</sup> Two broad patterns are emerging here. First, in all specifications the effect seems to weaken very gradually from 1906 onward, but then to re-surge in 1914. Again, it is hard to come up with an explanation for the 1914 effect, but at any rate it does not seem that the pogrom shock was a one-off effect. Second, in the benchmark and the “overkill” specifications (Columns 2 and 3), the year in which the pogrom effect was strongest was FY 1904, which was prior to the occurrence of almost all pogroms. This may be a case of a random outlying year, or if taken at face value, an indication for a pre-existing trend. For example, it could be that some pogrom-districts had experienced a local crisis already prior to the eruption of the second wave of pogroms, and that this crisis had caused both the pre-pogrom emigration and the pogrom themselves. If true, then the interpretation given above to the pogrom coefficients as a causal relation must be discounted.

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<sup>67</sup> In Columns 2 and 3, one effect has to be omitted and 1900 serves as an omitted category.

## 7 Conclusion

The main empirical findings presented in the paper are the following: Pre-1881 emigration took place in a confined area in Congress Poland, along the German border. From these regions it gradually spread out to neighboring provinces, reaching western-Lithuania during the 1880s and the south-west only in the late 1890s. By the turn of the century, Jewish migration became more evenly spread across the Pale, except for New-Russia which was still under-represented. The 1881 pogroms cannot be related in any visible and direct way to subsequent migration—the post-1881 trend was a direct continuation of the pre-1881 trend and did not involve migration from pogrom areas. The second wave of pogroms was more evenly distributed across the Pale, and pogroms may have produced local effects that increased the level of migration. The baseline estimate is that a pogrom-district had 24.9 percent more migration than similar non-pogrom-districts during the next nine years, and to the extent that there was a country-wide shock, or spillover effects across districts, this should be regarded as a lower bound. It does not seem that this was a one-off effect concentrated in the year of the pogroms and the one following it, and the evidence for heterogeneous region-specific effects is mixed. There is weak support at best to the claim that the second wave of pogroms generated more complete family migrations, and if it did it was a rather small change.

These findings help outlining an updated narrative of the Jewish migration from the Pale of Settlement and provide a relevant lesson for our understanding of the European pattern of transatlantic mass migration. The way through which the landsmanshaftn evolved during the last third of the nineteenth century is a substantial affirmation of the hypothesis expounded by [Gould \(1980\)](#) and [Baines \(1995\)](#), according to which gradual diffusion of migration networks across space was largely responsible for the rather late arrival of mass emigration to southern and eastern Europe. Little else can explain why the western-Lithuanian provinces, by all accounts the Pale's poorest, entered mass emigration with more than a decade lag behind Poland, and why the south-western provinces of Volhina, Podolia, and Kiev took a decade longer. The timing of the onset of Jewish mass migration had little to do with the crisis of 1881, and although pogroms may have well affected the inclination to migrate, this inclination could not have materialized in 1881 as it did in 1905 because the victims were not yet linked to previous chains of migration. The growth in Jewish migration during the 1880s was likely on the extensive margin, a result of a broadening of the geographical base of emigration, rather than on the intensive margin, stronger migration from provinces that were already sending migrants before.

Internal circumstances—pogroms, persecution, industrialization, declining costs of transportation, supposed absolute or relative declines in the standards of living, and demographic pressures—all of these have been mentioned as explanations for the timing of the Jewish mass migration. Economic conditions, such as real wages and employment prospects certainly did matter, and I study their

effects on the Jewish migration on [Spitzer \(2015c\)](#).<sup>68</sup> But I find previous explanations for the timing of the Jewish mass migration incomplete. I argue that the long time that migration chains took to diffuse across space was a key factor, possibly the chief factor that determined when, where, and how the Jewish mass migration was to occur. This claim is consistent with everything that we observe, and too much is left unexplained without it.

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<sup>68</sup> [Godley \(2001\)](#) and [Platt Boustan \(2007\)](#) already showed that the fluctuations of Jewish migration reacted to US business cycles, as did other migration streams from European countries.

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Table 1: Descriptive statistics

	Regional averages						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
A. DISTRICTS	Average	St.Dev.	Poland	Lithu.	S.West	New-Rus.	Inn.Rus.
Total pop. (1,000s)	181.45	109.15	115.64	186.03	233.78	276.26	73.06
Jewish pop. (1,000s)	21.75	21.21	16.34	26.32	24.99	25.60	4.45
Towns matched to EI	1.98	1.23	1.51	2.06	2.69	1.96	1.00
Coverage	0.59	0.26	0.55	0.50	0.60	0.77	0.99
Commerce/Manufacturing	-0.13	0.93	-0.14	-0.86	0.51	0.22	-0.67
Pogroms (district indicator)							
1881	0.13		0.01	0.00	0.28	0.44	0.00
1903–1906	0.50		0.23	0.55	0.69	0.89	0.14
1903–1906, major	0.30		0.11	0.25	0.43	0.74	0.00
Associations (per 100k-year)							
1861–1881	0.09	0.36	0.25	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00
1882–1905	0.68	0.94	1.02	0.90	0.26	0.23	0.42
1906–1920	0.99	1.09	1.44	1.04	0.75	0.35	0.16
Migration (per k-year)							
FY 1900–1905	13.36	21.28	13.03	19.06	8.44	6.44	38.39
FY 1906–1914	14.39	11.68	12.58	17.93	14.46	8.99	26.98
Observations	215		74	53	54	27	7

	Regional averages (Jews)						
	Non-Jews	Jews	Poland	Lithu.	S.West	New-Rus.	Inn.Rus.
B. IMMIGRANTS							
Female	0.293	0.459	0.442	0.467	0.460	0.481	0.489
Child (under 16)	0.122	0.287	0.283	0.289	0.299	0.309	0.286
Elderly (over 44)	0.028	0.063	0.055	0.064	0.064	0.084	0.101
Adult female 16–44	0.225	0.281	0.269	0.290	0.273	0.278	0.290
Adult male 16–44	0.625	0.369	0.393	0.357	0.364	0.328	0.324
Adult male 16-30	0.484	0.292	0.312	0.289	0.281	0.254	0.254
Marr. male/marr. female	3.225	1.175	1.251	1.078	1.243	0.948	1.018
Houshold size	1.585	2.375	2.248	2.309	2.553	2.724	2.688
Observations	996,315	602,144	61,022	133,799	73,154	42,685	9,810

Notes: Panel A reports district level averages. Coverage is the proportion of Jews within the district residing in the towns for which migration was identified. Commerce-to-manufacturing is the log of ratio of Jews employed in commerce to Jews employed in manufacturing, normalized to have mean zero and st. dev. one across all districts in the pale (the mean and the st. dev. are therefore slightly different in the current sample). A major pogrom in 1903–1906 is one in which either there were casualties or great damage reported. Associations is the number of associations pertaining to the districts over the period, divided by the district population. Migration is the number of immigrants in ages 16–50 in each year divided by the size of their respective cohorts in 1897, adjusted by the yearly ratio of observed migration to total Jewish-Russian migration. Migration is measured by Fiscal Years (e.g., FY 1904 went from July 1, 1904 to June 30, 1905).

Panel B. The sample in Cols. 1 and 2 includes all immigrants during FY 1900–1914 who reported a last place of residence that did not indicate a place outside Russia. The sample in Cols. 3–7 includes all predicted-Jews whose last place of residence was identified.

Table 2: Determinants of pogrom districts 1903–1906

DEP. VAR.: Pogrom indicator (mean = 0.50)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Pogrom 1881 (indicator)	0.326 <sup>a</sup> (0.099)	0.045 (0.103)	0.018 (0.103)	−0.002 (0.115)
Migration 1900–1905			0.006 (0.029)	0.009 (0.034)
Associations 1861–1881			−0.015 (0.099)	0.055 (0.125)
Associations 1882–1899			−0.069 <sup>c</sup> (0.040)	−0.064 (0.043)
Commerce/manufacturing			0.015 (0.042)	−0.046 (0.062)
Capital district			0.293 <sup>a</sup> (0.099)	0.263 <sup>b</sup> (0.103)
Constant	0.460 (0.036)			
Regions				
Poland		0.229 <sup>a</sup> (0.052)	0.249 <sup>a</sup> (0.072)	
Lithuania		0.547 <sup>a</sup> (0.061)	0.558 <sup>a</sup> (0.087)	
South-west		0.673 <sup>a</sup> (0.067)	0.649 <sup>a</sup> (0.086)	
New-Russia		0.869 <sup>a</sup> (0.097)	0.830 <sup>a</sup> (0.102)	
Inner-Russia		0.143 (0.168)	0.132 (0.183)	
Province F.E.				Yes
R-squared	0.048	0.230	0.278	0.387
p-value of F-stat.	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.037
Observations	215	215	215	215

Significance levels: <sup>a</sup> :  $p < 0.01$ ; <sup>b</sup> :  $p < 0.05$ ; <sup>c</sup> :  $p < 0.1$ .

Notes: The table reports the outcomes of OLS regressions predicting a binary indicator for at least one pogrom of any degree occurring in the district during the second wave (1903–1906). Migration is the log of mean yearly migration of cohorts aged 16–50 over FY 1900–1905, adjusted for the ratio between observed and official Jewish-Russian migration. Associations is the yearly mean number of landsmanshaftn incorporated, per 100,000 residents in the district (1897). Commerce/manufacturing is the standardized log of the ratio of Jews employed in commerce to Jews employed in manufacturing. Capital district is an indicator for the main district of the province, upon which the province is typically named. Standard errors are in parentheses.

Table 3: Determinants of major pogroms districts 1903–1906

DEP. VAR.: Major pogrom indicator (mean = 0.30)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Pogrom 1881 (indicator)	0.438 <sup>a</sup> (0.088)	0.196 <sup>b</sup> (0.095)	0.173 <sup>c</sup> (0.095)	0.172 (0.109)
Migration 1900–1905			0.006 (0.027)	0.007 (0.032)
Associations 1861–1881			0.002 (0.092)	0.049 (0.118)
Associations 1882–1899			−0.044 (0.037)	−0.049 (0.041)
Commerce/manufacturing			0.014 (0.039)	0.009 (0.059)
Capital district			0.233 <sup>b</sup> (0.091)	0.227 <sup>b</sup> (0.097)
Constant	0.241 (0.032)			
Regions				
Poland		0.105 <sup>b</sup> (0.047)	0.106 (0.066)	
Lithuania		0.245 <sup>a</sup> (0.056)	0.246 <sup>a</sup> (0.080)	
South-west		0.372 <sup>a</sup> (0.061)	0.348 <sup>a</sup> (0.079)	
New-Russia		0.654 <sup>a</sup> (0.089)	0.620 <sup>a</sup> (0.095)	
Inner-Russia		0.000 (0.154)	−0.017 (0.169)	
Province F.E.				Yes
R-squared	0.104	0.230	0.262	0.340
p-value of F-stat.	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.073
Observations	215	215	215	215

Significance levels: <sup>a</sup> :  $p < 0.01$ ; <sup>b</sup> :  $p < 0.05$ ; <sup>c</sup> :  $p < 0.1$ .

Notes: The table reports the outcomes of OLS regressions predicting a binary indicator for at least one pogrom of at least major damage occurring in the district during the second wave (1903–1906). Migration is the log of mean yearly migration of cohorts aged 16-50 over FY 1900–1905, adjusted for the ratio between observed and official Jewish-Russian migration. Associations is the yearly mean number of landsmanshaftn incorporated, per 100,000 residents in the district (1897). Commerce/manufacturing is the standardized log of the ratio of Jews employed in commerce to Jews employed in manufacturing. Capital district is an indicator for the main district of the province, upon which the province is typically named. Standard errors are in parentheses.

Table 4: Determinants of pogroms per-capita 1903–1906

DEP. VAR.: Pogrom per-capita (mean = 6.10, std = 10.60)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Pogrom 1881 (indicator)	3.866 <sup>c</sup> (2.136)	−4.126 <sup>c</sup> (2.176)	−3.520 (2.178)	−4.111 <sup>c</sup> (2.359)
Migration 1900–1905			−1.880 <sup>a</sup> (0.618)	−0.422 (0.693)
Associations 1861–1881			0.558 (2.107)	0.174 (2.556)
Associations 1882–1899			0.149 (0.843)	−0.166 (0.888)
Commerce/manufacturing			−0.365 (0.888)	−0.112 (1.277)
Capital district			2.034 (2.095)	0.680 (2.101)
Constant	5.597 (0.771)			
Regions				
Poland		1.721 (1.088)	4.555 <sup>a</sup> (1.525)	
Lithuania		3.888 <sup>a</sup> (1.285)	7.596 <sup>a</sup> (1.836)	
South-west		10.105 <sup>a</sup> (1.409)	13.210 <sup>a</sup> (1.814)	
New-Russia		18.933 <sup>a</sup> (2.044)	21.084 <sup>a</sup> (2.168)	
Inner-Russia		5.258 (3.536)	10.350 <sup>a</sup> (3.880)	
Province F.E.				Yes
R-squared	0.015	0.239	0.274	0.425
p-value of F-stat.	0.072	0.000	0.000	0.701
Observations	215	215	215	215

Significance levels: <sup>a</sup> :  $p < 0.01$ ; <sup>b</sup> :  $p < 0.05$ ; <sup>c</sup> :  $p < 0.1$ .

Notes: The table reports the outcomes of OLS regressions predicting pogroms per-capita of any degree occurring in the district during the second wave (1903–1906). Migration is the log of mean yearly migration of cohorts aged 16–50 over FY 1900–1905, adjusted for the ratio between observed and official Jewish-Russian migration. Associations is the yearly mean number of landsmanshaftn incorporated, per 100,000 residents in the district (1897). Commerce/manufacturing is the standardized log of the ratio of Jews employed in commerce to Jews employed in manufacturing. Capital district is an indicator for the main district of the province, upon which the province is typically named. Standard errors are in parentheses.

Table 5: Differences in migration after pogroms

DEP. VAR.: $\Delta \log$ migration/k (mean = 0.44, std. = 0.63)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Pogrom 1905 (indicator)	0.304 <sup>a</sup> (0.084)	0.233 <sup>a</sup> (0.059)		0.208 <sup>a</sup> (0.062)	0.162 <sup>b</sup> (0.065)
Migration 1900–1905		−0.401 <sup>a</sup> (0.026)	−0.424 <sup>a</sup> (0.032)	−0.395 <sup>a</sup> (0.029)	−0.441 <sup>a</sup> (0.035)
Coverage		0.411 <sup>a</sup> (0.118)	0.440 <sup>a</sup> (0.121)	0.393 <sup>a</sup> (0.123)	0.856 <sup>a</sup> (0.159)
Pogrom × Quart. 1			0.114 (0.110)		
Pogrom × Quart. 2			0.246 <sup>a</sup> (0.085)		
Pogrom × Quart. 3			0.248 <sup>a</sup> (0.093)		
Pogrom × Quart. 4			0.297 <sup>a</sup> (0.106)		
Associations 1861–1881				−0.141 (0.093)	0.056 (0.109)
Associations 1882–1899				0.015 (0.038)	0.032 (0.038)
Commerce/manufacturing				0.037 (0.034)	0.062 (0.055)
Capital district				0.111 (0.098)	0.069 (0.092)
Constant	0.291 (0.059)	0.857 (0.079)	0.887 (0.085)	0.864 (0.085)	
Province F.E.					Yes
R-squared	0.059	0.562	0.566	0.570	0.709
p-value of F-stat.	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Observations	213	213	213	213	213

Significance levels: <sup>a</sup> :  $p < 0.01$ ; <sup>b</sup> :  $p < 0.05$ ; <sup>c</sup> :  $p < 0.1$ .

Notes: The table reports OLS regressions predicting the change in log of yearly average migration per-1,000 (ages 16–50), adjusted according to the yearly ratio of observed-to-unobserved migration. Each observation is a district, and the difference is between the log average of the the pre-pogroms period (FY 1900–1905) and the post-pogrom period (FY 1906–1914). That is, the outcome is defined as  $\Delta \log \bar{m}_j = \log \bar{m}_j^{\text{after}} / \bar{m}_j^{\text{before}}$ , where  $\bar{m}_j^{\text{before}} = \frac{1}{N_{T_0}} \sum_{t \in T_0} m_{jt}$ ,  $T_0 = \{1900, \dots, 1905\}$ , and  $\bar{m}_j^{\text{after}}$  is similarly defined for FY 1906–1914. Two districts of the total 215 were omitted, due to zero migration counts prior to the pogroms. The treatment is an indicator for any pogrom identified down to the district-level. *Migration 1900–1905* is  $\log \bar{m}_j^{\text{before}}$ , or for after-pogrom years in districts that had a pogrom *before* 1905. *Coverage* is the ratio of Jewish population in towns covered by the geo-matching algorithm to total district population. The pogrom interactions are with quartiles of pre-pogroms migration (Quart. 1 is the lowest pre-pogroms migration quartile). *Associations* is the yearly mean number of landsmanshaftn incorporated per 100,000 residents in the district (1897). *Commerce/manufacturing* is the standardized log of the ratio of Jews employed in commerce to Jews employed in manufacturing. *Capital district* is an indicator for the principal district of the province. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.

Table 6: DID effects of pogroms on migration: any pogrom indicator

DEP. VAR.: log migration/k (mean = 2.01, std. = 1.26)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
After × pogrom		0.358 <sup>a</sup> (0.092)	0.302 <sup>a</sup> (0.087)	0.223 <sup>b</sup> (0.089)	0.154 <sup>c</sup> (0.083)
Pogrom (mean = 0.50)	0.080 (0.138)	−0.148 (0.173)	−0.174 (0.132)		
After		0.332 <sup>a</sup> (0.064)			
Coverage			2.088 <sup>a</sup> (0.390)		
Associations 1861–1881			−0.009 (0.215)		
Associations 1882–1899			0.102 <sup>b</sup> (0.047)		
Commerce/manufacturing			−0.044 (0.105)		
Capital district			0.354 <sup>b</sup> (0.162)		
Constant	1.971 (0.102)	1.772 (0.126)			
Year F.E. (× interaction)			Yes	×Reg.	×Prov.
Geographic F.E.			Prov.	Dist.	Dist.
Predicted treat. eff. (treated)		0.430	0.352	0.249	0.167
Predicted treat. eff. (all)		0.274	0.258	0.176	0.116
R-squared	0.001	0.045	0.545	0.792	0.840
p-value of F-stat.	0.561	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Observations	3,225	3,225	3,225	3,225	3,225

Significance levels: <sup>a</sup> :  $p < 0.01$ ; <sup>b</sup> :  $p < 0.05$ ; <sup>c</sup> :  $p < 0.1$ .

Notes: The table reports OLS regressions predicting the log of migration per-1,000 (ages 16–50), adjusted according to the yearly ratio of observed-to-unobserved migration. Each observation is a year×district, where each district is observed in each of the FY 1900–1914. The treatment includes pogroms that were at least identified, using the merged list (Motzkin + AJYB), where the measure is an indicator for the district experiencing a pogrom, and the location of the pogrom was identified up to the district level (including unidentified coordinates). *After* is an indicator for FY 1906 and above, or for after-pogrom years in districts that had a pogrom *before* 1905. *Pogrom* is an indicator for the district experiencing a pogrom during FY 1900–1914. *After×pogrom* is an indicator for the district experiencing a pogrom during or before that year. *Coverage* is the ratio of Jewish population in towns covered by the geo-matching algorithm to total district population. *Associations* is the yearly mean number of landsmanshaftn incorporated per 100,000 residents in the district (1897). *Commerce/manufacturing* is the standardized log of the ratio of Jews employed in commerce to Jews employed in manufacturing. *Capital district* is an indicator for the principal district of the province. Year fixed-effects are interacted with region dummies in col. 4 and with province dummies in col. 5. The predicted treatment effect for all (treated) districts is the predicted rate of increase in migration in FY 1906–1914 in all (pogrom) districts attributed to the pogroms, i.e.,  $\Sigma \hat{m}_{jt} / \Sigma \hat{m}_{jt} (\text{After} \times \text{pogrom} = 0) - 1$ . Standard errors, clustered by district, are reported in parentheses.

Table 7: DID effects of pogroms on migration: pogroms per-capita

DEP. VAR.: log migration/k (mean = 2.01, std. = 1.26)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
After × pogrom		0.016 <sup>a</sup> (0.004)	0.017 <sup>a</sup> (0.004)	0.015 <sup>a</sup> (0.004)	0.009 <sup>b</sup> (0.004)
Pogrom (mean = 6.10, std. = 10.60)	-0.021 <sup>a</sup> (0.006)	-0.031 <sup>a</sup> (0.007)	-0.020 <sup>b</sup> (0.009)		
After		0.416 <sup>a</sup> (0.052)			
Coverage			2.169 <sup>a</sup> (0.326)		
Associations 1861–1881			-0.011 (0.215)		
Associations 1882–1899			0.097 <sup>b</sup> (0.048)		
Commerce/manufacturing			-0.039 (0.104)		
Capital district			0.339 <sup>b</sup> (0.147)		
Constant	2.139 (0.080)	1.885 (0.099)			
Year F.E. (× interaction)			Yes	×Reg.	×Prov.
Geographic F.E.			Prov.	Dist.	Dist.
Predicted treat. eff. (treated)		0.101	0.103	0.133	0.079
Predicted treat. eff. (all)		0.063	0.077	0.093	0.055
R-squared	0.031	0.075	0.550	0.793	0.840
p-value of F-stat.	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Observations	3,225	3,225	3,225	3,225	3,225

Significance levels: <sup>a</sup> :  $p < 0.01$ ; <sup>b</sup> :  $p < 0.05$ ; <sup>c</sup> :  $p < 0.1$ .

Notes: The table reports OLS regressions predicting the log of migration per-1,000 (ages 16–50), adjusted according to the yearly ratio of observed-to-unobserved migration. Each observation is a year×district, where each district is observed in each of the FY 1900–1914. The treatment includes pogroms that were at least identified, using the merged list (Motzkin + AJYB), where the measure is pogrom per capita in the district, and the location of the pogrom was identified up to the district level (including unidentified coordinates). *After* is an indicator for FY 1906 and above, or for after-pogrom years in districts that had a pogrom *before* 1905. *Pogrom* is pogrom per capita in the district during FY 1900–1914. *After×pogrom* is pogrom per capita in the district during or before that year. *Coverage* is the ratio of Jewish population in towns covered by the geo-matching algorithm to total district population. *Associations* is the yearly mean number of landsmanshaftn incorporated per 100,000 residents in the district (1897). *Commerce/manufacturing* is the standardized log of the ratio of Jews employed in commerce to Jews employed in manufacturing. *Capital district* is an indicator for the principal district of the province. Year fixed-effects are interacted with region dummies in col. 4 and with province dummies in col. 5. The predicted treatment effect for all (treated) districts is the predicted rate of increase in migration in FY 1906–1914 in all (pogrom) districts attributed to the pogroms, i.e.,  $\Sigma \hat{m}_{jt} / \Sigma \hat{m}_{jt} (\text{After} \times \text{pogrom} = 0) - 1$ . Standard errors, clustered by district, are reported in parentheses.

Table 8: DID effects of pogroms on migration: major pogrom indicator

DEP. VAR.: log migration/k (mean = 2.01, std. = 1.26)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
After × pogrom		0.293 <sup>a</sup> (0.098)	0.241 <sup>b</sup> (0.093)	0.136 (0.101)	0.089 (0.089)
Pogrom (mean = 0.30)	0.037 (0.146)	−0.151 (0.182)	−0.115 (0.146)		
After		0.410 <sup>a</sup> (0.053)			
Coverage			2.083 <sup>a</sup> (0.399)		
Associations 1861–1881			−0.010 (0.215)		
Associations 1882–1899			0.103 <sup>b</sup> (0.047)		
Commerce/manufacturing			−0.046 (0.105)		
Capital district			0.350 <sup>b</sup> (0.154)		
Constant	2.001 (0.084)	1.755 (0.104)			
Year F.E. (× interaction)			Yes	×Reg.	×Prov.
Geographic F.E.			Prov.	Dist.	Dist.
Predicted treat. eff. (treated)		0.340	0.272	0.146	0.094
Predicted treat. eff. (all)		0.143	0.152	0.072	0.047
R-squared	0.000	0.040	0.543	0.791	0.839
p-value of F-stat.	0.801	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Observations	3,225	3,225	3,225	3,225	3,225

Significance levels: <sup>a</sup> :  $p < 0.01$ ; <sup>b</sup> :  $p < 0.05$ ; <sup>c</sup> :  $p < 0.1$ .

Notes: The table reports OLS regressions predicting the log of migration per-1,000 (ages 16–50), adjusted according to the yearly ratio of observed-to-unobserved migration. Each observation is a year×district, where each district is observed in each of the FY 1900–1914. The treatment includes pogroms that were at least major, using the merged list (Motzkin + AJYB), where the measure is an indicator for the district experiencing a pogrom, and the location of the pogrom was identified up to the district level (including unidentified coordinates). *After* is an indicator for FY 1906 and above, or for after-pogrom years in districts that had a pogrom *before* 1905. *Pogrom* is an indicator for the district experiencing a pogrom during FY 1900–1914. *After×pogrom* is an indicator for the district experiencing a pogrom during or before that year. *Coverage* is the ratio of Jewish population in towns covered by the geo-matching algorithm to total district population. *Associations* is the yearly mean number of landsmanshaftn incorporated per 100,000 residents in the district (1897). *Commerce/manufacturing* is the standardized log of the ratio of Jews employed in commerce to Jews employed in manufacturing. *Capital district* is an indicator for the principal district of the province. Year fixed-effects are interacted with region dummies in col. 4 and with province dummies in col. 5. The predicted treatment effect for all (treated) districts is the predicted rate of increase in migration in FY 1906–1914 in all (pogrom) districts attributed to the pogroms, i.e.,  $\Sigma \hat{m}_{jt} / \Sigma \hat{m}_{jt} (\text{After} \times \text{pogrom} = 0) - 1$ . Standard errors, clustered by district, are reported in parentheses.

Table 9: DID effects of pogroms on migration: major pogroms per capita

DEP. VAR.: log migration/k (mean = 2.01, std. = 1.26)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
After × pogrom		0.022 <sup>a</sup> (0.006)	0.022 <sup>a</sup> (0.006)	0.017 <sup>b</sup> (0.007)	0.011 (0.008)
Pogrom (mean = 3.00, std. = 7.52)	-0.022 <sup>a</sup> (0.009)	-0.036 <sup>a</sup> (0.011)	-0.012 (0.011)		
After		0.431 <sup>a</sup> (0.048)			
Coverage			2.092 <sup>a</sup> (0.388)		
Associations 1861–1881			-0.010 (0.215)		
Associations 1882–1899			0.102 <sup>b</sup> (0.047)		
Commerce/manufacturing			-0.044 (0.105)		
Capital district			0.356 <sup>b</sup> (0.158)		
Constant	2.078 (0.074)	1.817 (0.092)			
Year F.E. (× interaction)			Yes	×Reg.	×Prov.
Geographic F.E.			Prov.	Dist.	Dist.
Predicted treat. eff. (treated)		0.109	0.109	0.120	0.078
Predicted treat. eff. (all)		0.045	0.063	0.059	0.039
R-squared	0.018	0.059	0.545	0.792	0.840
p-value of F-stat.	0.010	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Observations	3,225	3,225	3,225	3,225	3,225

Significance levels: <sup>a</sup> :  $p < 0.01$ ; <sup>b</sup> :  $p < 0.05$ ; <sup>c</sup> :  $p < 0.1$ .

Notes: The table reports OLS regressions predicting the log of migration per-1,000 (ages 16–50), adjusted according to the yearly ratio of observed-to-unobserved migration. Each observation is a year×district, where each district is observed in each of the FY 1900–1914. The treatment includes pogroms that were at least major, using the merged list (Motzkin + AJYB), where the measure is pogrom per capita in the district, and the location of the pogrom was identified up to the district level (including unidentified coordinates). *After* is an indicator for FY 1906 and above, or for after-pogrom years in districts that had a pogrom *before* 1905. *Pogrom* is pogrom per capita in the district during FY 1900–1914. *After×pogrom* is pogrom per capita in the district during or before that year. *Coverage* is the ratio of Jewish population in towns covered by the geo-matching algorithm to total district population. *Associations* is the yearly mean number of landsmanshaftn incorporated per 100,000 residents in the district (1897). *Commerce/manufacturing* is the standardized log of the ratio of Jews employed in commerce to Jews employed in manufacturing. *Capital district* is an indicator for the principal district of the province. Year fixed-effects are interacted with region dummies in col. 4 and with province dummies in col. 5. The predicted treatment effect for all (treated) districts is the predicted rate of increase in migration in FY 1906–1914 in all (pogrom) districts attributed to the pogroms, i.e.,  $\Sigma \hat{m}_{jt} / \Sigma \hat{m}_{jt}(\text{After} \times \text{pogrom} = 0) - 1$ . Standard errors, clustered by district, are reported in parentheses.

Table 10: DID effects of pogroms on migrants demographics

<i>Dep. Vars.</i>	(1)	(2)	(3)
Female	0.020 (0.013)	0.029 (0.016)	0.020 (0.017)
Child (under 16)	0.024 (0.012)	0.012 (0.013)	0.009 (0.014)
Elderly (over 44)	-0.001 (0.006)	-0.003 (0.007)	-0.003 (0.008)
Adult female 16-44	0.010 (0.011)	0.026 (0.015)	0.020 (0.015)
Adult male 16-44	-0.033 (0.016)	-0.036 (0.020)	-0.026 (0.020)
Adult male 16-30	-0.028 (0.015)	-0.030 (0.018)	-0.028 (0.018)
Married mal./married fem.	-0.091 (0.083)	-0.059 (0.083)	-0.075 (0.078)
Household size	0.111 (0.063)	0.046 (0.070)	0.058 (0.068)
Time F.E.	Year	Year ×Region	Year ×Prov.
Geographic F.E.	Province	District	District
District controls	✓		

Notes: Each coefficient is derived from a separate regression, where the dependent variable is a demographic statistics and each column has a different specification, corresponding to specifications (4)-(6) in the Table ???. Married male/Married female is the (log) ratio of married adult males to married adult women; where no married adult males were counted the value is set to the (log) minimum ratio over the entire sample; where no married adult females are counted, missing value was assigned. Household size is averaged over individuals (not over households). In all specifications, each observation is district×year, the number of observations is 3,225, except for the regressions on the (log) share of married-males to married-women, where n=2,900 due to cases with zero married-females.

Table 11: Demographics by periods and ethnicity

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	1898-1904	1905	1906-1914	1920-1925
<b>A. Jews</b>				
Age	21.398	22.402	21.003	24.847
Female	0.438	0.347	0.479	0.591
Child (under 16)	0.296	0.228	0.293	0.330
Elderly (over 44)	0.061	0.038	0.067	0.151
Adult female 16-44	0.257	0.215	0.295	0.327
Adult male 16-44	0.386	0.519	0.345	0.192
Adult male 16-30	0.295	0.399	0.277	0.151
Married mal./married fem.	1.250	2.229	1.031	0.410
Household size	2.367	2.077	2.418	2.895
Observations	127,684	49,973	444,742	131,818
<b>B. Non-Jews</b>				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	1898-1904	1905	1906-1914	1920-1925
Age	23.318	23.838	23.331	24.809
Female	0.296	0.268	0.296	0.562
Child (under 16)	0.159	0.130	0.114	0.270
Elderly (over 44)	0.031	0.024	0.028	0.093
Adult female 16-44	0.208	0.196	0.232	0.387
Adult male 16-44	0.602	0.649	0.627	0.250
Adult male 16-30	0.460	0.478	0.489	0.126
Married mal./married fem.	2.396	3.305	3.399	0.808
Household size	1.880	1.575	1.526	2.169
Observations	213,095	56,116	758,805	64,793

Notes: The table reports averages of demographic characteristics for all immigrants of Russian nationality who reported a last place of residence not indicating a place outside Russia, excluding the earlier years FY 1893–1897 and the WWI period FY 1915–1919 (when the number of immigrants passing through Ellis Island was very small). The periods are in terms of fiscal years, and ethnicity is determined by the *who-is-a-Jew* algorithm. Married male/Married female is the (log) ratio of married adult males to married adult females.

Table 12: DID effects of pogroms on migration, by region

<i>Dep. Var.: Migration</i>	(1)	(2)	(3)
Poland	0.254 (0.246)	-0.023 (0.164)	-0.022 (0.139)
Lithuania	0.280 (0.139)	0.512 (0.183)	0.161 (0.171)
South-west	0.233 (0.128)	0.206 (0.147)	0.194 (0.171)
New-Russia	0.312 (0.130)	-0.067 (0.267)	0.347 (0.283)
Inner-Russia	0.168 (0.429)	-0.073 (0.164)	-0.073 (0.173)
Time F.E.	Year	Year ×Region	Year ×Prov.
Geographic F.E.	Province	District	District
District controls	✓		
R-squared	0.455	0.793	0.840
P-value of F-test	0.000	0.000	0.000

Notes: The reported coefficients are for the region-specific interaction terms with  $\text{after} \times \text{pogrom}$ . Specifications (1)-(3) correspond to specifications (4)-(6) in the DID regressions on Table ???. The district controls include commerce-manufacturing, capital-district indicator, and Landsmanshaftn 1899. Standard errors, clustered by district, are in parentheses. In all specifications, the number of observations is 3,225.

Table 13: DID effects of pogroms on migration, by year

A. Before	(1)	(2)	(3)	B. After	(1)	(2)	(3)
1900	-0.217 (0.189)			1906	0.455 (0.141)	0.338 (0.154)	0.228 (0.153)
1901	-0.178 (0.176)	-0.173 (0.134)	-0.109 (0.143)	1907	0.334 (0.142)	0.376 (0.184)	0.326 (0.198)
1902	0.042 (0.173)	0.010 (0.171)	-0.038 (0.184)	1908	0.260 (0.142)	0.338 (0.160)	0.252 (0.167)
1903	-0.101 (0.164)	0.081 (0.149)	0.089 (0.151)	1909	0.211 (0.140)	0.325 (0.169)	0.245 (0.179)
1904	0.266 (0.162)	0.398 (0.166)	0.289 (0.174)	1910	0.222 (0.140)	0.274 (0.181)	0.121 (0.189)
1905	0.230 (0.136)	0.304 (0.162)	0.216 (0.171)	1911	0.183 (0.137)	0.249 (0.176)	0.119 (0.171)
				1912	0.181 (0.150)	0.263 (0.186)	0.116 (0.187)
				1913	0.251 (0.134)	0.312 (0.202)	0.162 (0.205)
				1914	0.359 (0.137)	0.349 (0.189)	0.197 (0.176)
Time F.E.	Year	Year ×Region	Year ×Prov.	R-squared	0.458	0.793	0.841
Geog. F.E.	Province	District	District	P-val. F	0.000	0.000	0.000
Dist. conts.	✓						

Notes: Panel B reports the same regressions as Panel A, its columns being continuations of the respective columns in Panel A, separated for convenience by before and after years. The reported coefficients are year-specific DID effects, interaction of year×pogrom. Specifications (1)-(3) correspond to specifications (4)-(6) in the DID regressions on Table ???. The district controls include commerce-manufacturing, capital-district indicator, and Landsmanshaftn 1899. Standard errors, clustered by district, are in parentheses. In all specifications, the number of observations is 3,225.




Figure 1: Jewish Immigration from Russia to the United States 1881–1914

Notes: For the period prior to 1899, no official statistics exists separately on Russian Jews. Figures on the years 1881–1898 are based on Joseph's (1914, Table XII) estimates, with corrections by Godley (2001, Table 5.4). Figures on 1899–1914 is from official statistics, as reported in Ferenczi and Willcox (1929, Table XXXII). Migration is counted in fiscal years, going from July 1st (previous year) to June 30th (current year).




Figure 2: European Emigration and Real Wages 1870-1910

Note: Emigration rates are decade averages in yearly terms per 100,000 (Ferenczi and Willcox 1929, Text Table 9, pp. 200-201). Real wages are internationally comparable PPP-adjusted decade averages revised in O'Rourke and Williamson (1997) as reported in Hatton and Williamson (2008, Table 4.2), where 100 is the level of British real wage in 1905. Real wages are one year lagged relative to migration (e.g., 1870-1879 wages correspond to 1871-1880 emigration). Real wages in the 1900s are for the years 1900-1913. Fitted lines represent predictions of univariate OLS regressions. Correlation coefficient and slope are reported in the figures.





Figure 3: Regions and Provinces of the Pale of Settlement

Note: The map plots the twenty-five provinces of the Pale of Settlement and their grouping to four main regions. Poland is Congress Poland, also known as The Kingdom of Poland or Vistula Land. The region of Lithuania is also known as the North-West.





The Pogroms of 1881

Figure 5: The Pogroms of 1881




Figure 6: The Pogroms of 1903-1906




Figure 7: Kalarash Immigration in the Ellis Island Sample 1900–1914

Notes: The figure reports the yearly number of immigrants who were identified as Jews according to the WIAJ algorithm, and were linked to Kalarash by the geo-matching of Ellis Island immigrants to Russian shtetls. The numbers are raw, and were not adjusted by the ratio of observed-to-total Jewish Russian migration. Fiscal years went from July of the previous year to June of the current year.





Figure 8: The Pogroms of 1881 and Landsmanshaftn Incorporation by 1880

(a) Landsmanshaftn Incorporated during 1881–1885



(b) Landsmanshaftn Incorporated during 1886–1890





Figure 9: The Pogroms of 1881 and Landsmanshaftn Incorporation during 1881–1890

(a) Landsmanshaftn Incorporated during 1891–1895



(b) Landsmanshaftn Incorporated during 1896–1900





Figure 11: The Pogroms of 1881 and Landsmanshaftn Incorporation during 1891–1900

(a) Landsmanshaftn Incorporated during 1906–1910



(b) Landsmanshaftn Incorporated during 1911–1915




Figure 13: The Pogroms of 1903–1906 and Landsmanshaftn Incorporation during 1906–1915




Figure 15: Convergence in migration rates and the pogroms

Notes: Each observation represents a single district from among the 215 districts that had towns matched to the Ellis Island arrival records (outliers beyond the range of this graph are not plotted but are included in the regression, districts with zero pre-pogrom migration were omitted). The horizontal axis represents yearly migration per-1,000 in ages 16–50 during the pre-pogrom years (FY 1900–1905), drawn in logarithmic scale:  $\bar{m}_j^{\text{before}} = \frac{1}{N_{T_0}} \sum_{t \in T_0} m_{jt}$ , where  $T_0 = \{1900, \dots, 1905\}$ . The vertical axis represents the change in the rate of migration (drawn in logarithmic scale), as defined above, between the pre- and post-pogrom years. That is,  $\Delta \bar{m}_j = \bar{m}_j^{\text{after}} / \bar{m}_j^{\text{before}} - 1$ , where  $\bar{m}_j^{\text{after}}$  is defined similarly with  $T_1 = \{1906, \dots, 1914\}$ . For example,  $\Delta \bar{m}_j = 2$  stands for 200% increase in migration. The curves represent the predictions of a kernel regression with Epanechnikov kernel function and a bandwidth of 0.2, separately for districts that did not experience a pogrom and districts that had at least one pogrom identified in the merged list. The horizontal line at zero represents no change in migration.




Figure 16: Convergence in migration rates: Cross-district variation by year

Notes: Each observation represents a single year. The vertical axis represents standard deviation of log migration per-1,000 in ages 16–50, across the 215 districts that had towns matched to the Ellis Island arrival records. Year-districts with zero migration were omitted. The number of non-zero observations at each year is reported above the curve.

## A Does Landsmanshaft Incorporation Represent Migration?

The validity of the evidence in Section 4 rely on the assumption that incorporation of hometown-based associations is correlated with the rate of contemporary migration. The main threat to this assumption is that variation in the rates of incorporation is caused by variations in the tendency to form associations. For several reasons, I deem this to be very implausible. First, landsmanshaftn had cultural components to them that may have been subjected to regional idiosyncrasies, but above all they were an institution that successfully served a diverse set of material needs that must have been shared by communities of all origins: medical and unemployment insurance, synagogues, burials, all were vitally needed and efficiently provided by the landsmanshaftn to a transplanted close-knitted community, within which trust and solidarity prevailed as a matter of course. As shown in Section 4, sooner or later neighboring and farther regions did follow suit in forming associations. So even if there had been regional differences in preferences for associations, one must explain why they did not persist long. Therefore, preference towards associations could not have created sharp regional differences, when the demand-inducing needs and the capacity to associate and incorporate were available for all communities.

Could it be that regions did not differ based on their tendency to found associations, but based on their tendency to legally incorporate them? It is true that not all associations were legally incorporated, but beyond the basic level of very restricted activity, official incorporation was a necessity in running associations that were economically active, had revenues and expenses, and were making financial commitments. Perhaps the landsmanshaft institution was a new innovation, that in itself simply needed time to diffuse over space, and the geographic trend really represents the diffusion of this institution rather than the diffusion of migration? Again, there is very little reason to suspect that this was the case. All of these associations were incorporated in Manhattan; the distance that was necessary for this innovation to diffuse was not from one Pale region to another, but from one Lower East Side block to another. Replication of such an institution would have been an instantaneous matter, and should not have depended on the Pale's geography.

Other dangers to a correct representation of migration by landsmanshaftn are harder to rule out. The data relate to Manhattan only. Indeed, one-half of American Jewish immigrants lived in New York City (as of 1920), and the Manhattan activity most likely encompassed also Jews living in the other boroughs of the city.<sup>69</sup> Did other immigrants from regions beyond the early migration strip skip the Big Apple and cluster elsewhere in the United States? Alternatively, were they living in New York, but did not yet form the critical mass to found town-based associations? While both concerns are valid, it is important to stress that the difference between the early migration strip and the rest of the Pale, shown in the map in Figure 8, was sharp: virtually all indications for early migration came within it, none outside it. The suspicions above, if true, point at the

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<sup>69</sup> See Spitzer (2015b) for the distribution of Jewish immigrants across US localities. Yiddish native speakers in 1920 were represented in roughly similar proportions in Manhattan, Brooklyn, and the Bronx, with lower representation in Queens and Staten Island.

possibility of a difference in degree, but cannot account for such sharp qualitative difference. Even if regions outside the strip were more likely to concentrate outside Manhattan, some of them must have formed communities in New York. If there was a critical mass problem, it must have been overcome by at least a few communities, certainly those from the larger cities. Sharp patterns require sharp explanations; and none seem to seriously cast doubt on the conclusion that early emigration was concentrated in a narrow area.

Evidence on the correlation between landsmanshaft incorporation and migration can be gathered from the later years (1900–1914), on which direct migration data is available from the Ellis Island records. Since incorporation is a low-frequency measure,<sup>70</sup> at the very fine resolution the landsmanshaft indicators performs rather unimpressively as a proxy for migration. As reported in Table A1, Column 1, at the district-year level the coefficient of correlation between the (adjusted) migration per-capita and landsmanshaft incorporation per-capita is only 0.0924 (as Column 1 in Table A1 also reports, the coefficient from a univariate regression of associations on migration is statistically significant at the 5-percent level). But when the counts of incorporated associations and migrants are aggregated at the province-year level, the correlation coefficient increases to 0.33 (Column 2). Columns 3 and 4 repeat the same exercise while aggregating counts of migration and associations by five-years periods. When aggregated at the district level, the correlation coefficient is 0.17, going up to 0.49 at the province-5-year level.

The conclusion is that the rate of incorporation of associations is a poor proxy for migration at a very fine resolution, but a good one in aggregate levels. The plot on Figure A1 represents the correlation between landsmanshaft incorporation and migration at the province-5 year aggregation (corresponding to Column 4 in Table A1). With the exception of a handful of outliers, the two variables seem closely aligned. Therefore, to the extent that similar patterns of correlations between migration and associations existed in the previous decades, it seems plausible to interpret the landsmanshaft incorporation as broadly representing the evolution of the Jewish migration.<sup>71</sup>

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<sup>70</sup> Most (82.3 percent) year-districts did not have an incorporation.

<sup>71</sup> In future versions of this paper I intend to cross-verify the validity of the data by collecting biographical-encyclopedic entries that enable to record the places of origin of early Russian Jewish migrants.

Table A1: CORRELATION BETWEEN MIGRATION AND ASSOCIATIONS

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<i>Time aggregation</i>	Single Years		5 Years	
<i>Geog. aggregation</i>	District	Province	District	Province
Corr. coef.	0.0924	0.3307	0.1700	0.4925
OLS coef.	0.0144	0.0283	0.0183	0.0408
OLS s.e.	0.0070	0.0127	0.0082	0.0145
Observations	3,225	390	645	78

Note: The table reports the coefficients of correlation between (adjusted) migration per-capita and incorporation of associations per capita, as well as the estimated coefficients and standard errors from a univariate OLS regression of associations (per-100,000, per year) on migration (per-1,000, per year). Cols. 1 and 3 aggregate associations and migration at the district level. Cols. 2 and 4 aggregate at the province level. Cols. 1 and 2 aggregate by year. Cols. 3 and 4 aggregate by periods of five years. (1900–1904, 1905–1909, and 1910–1914). Standard errors are clustered at the unit of geographic aggregation (district or province). The observations are from 215 districts within 26 provinces, and over 15 years.




Figure A1: Landsmanshaft incorporation and migration—province-5 year aggregation

Notes: Each observation represents a single province over a five years period. The periods over which the counts were aggregated are 1900–1904, 1905–1909, and 1910–1914. The landsmanshaftn measure is incorporations per capita, per year: the number of associations related to the province that were incorporated within the five years period, multiplied by  $100,000 \div (5 \times \text{province population})$ . The migration measure is total migration from the province of migrants aged 16–50, adjusted for the share of observed-to-unobserved migration, multiplied by  $1,000 \div (5 \times \text{province population})$ , where the province population is in each year the size of the population in the cohorts that are 16–50 years old. The dotted line is the fitted OLS univariate prediction (see Table A1, Col. (4)).

## B The Pogrom Treatment: Various Definitions

As opposed to the list of the first-wave pogroms, the reports on the second-wave pogroms contain details on the severity of most events, and this information enables clearing away the less consequential cases, particularly those that were hard to identify or on which we have little or no information reported. Table B1 reports the means of the district-level pogrom indicators, based on various different thresholds for what amounts to a pogrom. Column 1 counts any event that was mentioned as a pogrom, even if no details were provided. The top three rows refer to the data from the merged list, meaning that an indicator is positive if either Motzkin’s report or the AJYB list had at least one pogrom assigned to the district. According to this most inclusive measure, 50.2 percent of the districts had at least a single pogrom (this is the same figure reported in Table 1).

Some of these events were not matched to a known location. The second row reports only indicators for pogroms that could be traced to a particular locality, and in the merged list this makes an infinitesimal difference: 49.8 percent of the districts had a geo-located pogrom. The third row reports indicators for a further restricted definition, districts in which at least one town that is in the shtetls data had a pogrom. Again, removing the pogroms that occurred outside the 2,300 towns identified in the shtetls data makes a minuscule difference. These small differences imply that in almost all cases, if there was a pogrom anywhere in the district that is not mapped by the shtetls data, mainly villages and very small communities, there was also a pogrom in one of the larger identified Jewish communities. The next 6 rows repeat the same statistics for Motzkin’s report and the AJYB list separately. The main thing to notice is that the AJYB list had greater coverage; 47.4 percent of districts were hit by at least one pogrom, as opposed to 25.1 according to Motzkin. However, the AJYB list was probably less accurate and reported many cases with no details on damage.

The next columns increasingly filter out the less severe events. Column 2 reports the averages of district pogrom indicators while only counting cases that had any information on damage or casualties caused. This omission already cuts down the share of affected districts to 35.8 percent according to the merged list, mainly due to removing a large number of pogroms reported without details on the AJYB list. Column 3 counts only pogroms that were at least “major”, an arbitrary definition used here for pogroms that either had at least one casualty (wounded or dead) or large damage caused (at least 100 families or 500 persons affected, or damage of over 20,000 Rubles). As reported above, according to the merged list 29.8 percent of the districts had at least one major pogrom. Column 4, reporting “violent” pogroms, uses a definition that raises the threshold to at least one dead or wounded. Finally Column 5 counts only the most severe cases, the “deadly” pogroms. These are the cases in which at least 10 Jews were killed or 50 were wounded, and presumably, they are also the least likely to have been inaccurately reported. Focusing only on the deadly pogroms only removes more than half the districts from the pogrom group, as only 11.6 percent of the districts are tagged with a deadly pogrom according to the merged list.

District indicators effectively capture the extensive margin of the pogroms—whether a district was or was not exposed, but they do not reflect the intensive margin. This measure bundles together districts that only had a single pogrom with districts that had many. Another shortcoming of the indicator measure is that it does not distinguish between large districts and small districts; this is an important distinction if the proportion of the population actually exposed to events in the district would vary by its area or by the size of its population (for example, if a single pogrom occurred in both Luxemburg and France, the average citizen of Luxemburg would effectively be more exposed to the pogrom than an average French). Table B2 reports the averages and standard deviations of pogroms per capita, an alternative treatment measure that captures the intensive margin. When counting any pogrom reported in the merged list, an average district had 6.1 cases per 100 thousand Jewish residents counted in the 1897 census. The standard deviation is 10.6, reflecting a distribution with a heaping at zero and a rather long right tail. As opposed to the case of the district indicators, when counting pogroms per capita, restricting the counted pogroms to geo-located localities, or to localities in the shtetls data only, does reduce the average count. An average district had 4.7 pogroms per 100 thousand when only pogroms that took place within localities in the shtetls data are counted. This measure is also sensitive to the threshold level of pogrom severity; it is halved to 3 when only major pogroms are counted, and further down to 0.6 deadly ones per 100 thousand.

Table B1: Pogrom statistics: district indicators 1903–1906

Pogrom severity:	(1) Any	(2) Minor	(3) Major	(4) Violent	(5) Deadly
Merged list					
District	0.502	0.358	0.298	0.274	0.116
Locality	0.498	0.353	0.298	0.270	0.116
Shtetl	0.488	0.335	0.288	0.256	0.112
Motzkin					
District	0.251	0.237	0.214	0.186	0.084
Locality	0.251	0.237	0.214	0.181	0.084
Shtetl	0.219	0.214	0.205	0.167	0.079
AJYB					
District	0.474	0.284	0.214	0.214	0.107
Locality	0.460	0.279	0.214	0.214	0.107
Shtetl	0.456	0.270	0.209	0.209	0.107

Notes: The table reports the share of districts that experienced at least one pogrom, from among the 215 districts that were covered by the Ellis Island matching algorithm. Upper rows report the share of pogrom districts according to the merged list (Motzkin + AJYB); remaining rows report the two lists separately. Within each list, the *District* rows count all districts that had at least one pogrom, even if it was not identified down to a locality; *Locality* are districts that had the location (in coordinates) of at least one pogrom identified; and *Shtetl* are districts that had at least one pogrom in one of the towns in the Shtetlach data. Each column reports a different severity threshold. *Any*: including pogroms with no details reported; *Minor*: material damage or at least one dead or wounded; *Major*: large material damage or at least one dead or wounded; *Violent*: at least one dead or wounded; *Deadly*: at least 10 dead or 50 wounded. Each severity level includes all levels above it (e.g., a major pogrom is also included within the minor pogrom).

Table B2: Pogrom statistics: pogroms per-capita 1903–1906

Pogrom severity:	(1) Any	(2) Minor	(3) Major	(4) Violent	(5) Deadly
Merged list					
District	6.100 (10.599)	3.862 (8.195)	3.003 (7.516)	2.036 (4.805)	0.622 (2.841)
Locality	5.755 (10.330)	3.694 (8.026)	2.930 (7.415)	2.022 (4.806)	0.622 (2.841)
Shtetl	4.719 (8.451)	2.889 (6.472)	2.487 (6.262)	1.855 (4.718)	0.602 (2.830)
Motzkin					
District	3.446 (8.783)	3.121 (8.040)	2.642 (7.506)	1.645 (4.704)	0.529 (2.805)
Locality	3.284 (8.599)	2.960 (7.837)	2.569 (7.400)	1.630 (4.704)	0.529 (2.805)
Shtetl	2.366 (6.463)	2.248 (6.336)	2.134 (6.224)	1.472 (4.607)	0.510 (2.794)
AJYB					
District	4.810 (8.720)	2.110 (4.956)	1.303 (3.937)	1.303 (3.937)	0.535 (2.737)
Locality	4.521 (8.480)	2.072 (4.954)	1.303 (3.937)	1.303 (3.937)	0.535 (2.737)
Shtetl	4.289 (8.170)	1.942 (4.842)	1.276 (3.924)	1.276 (3.924)	0.535 (2.737)

Notes: The table reports the average pogroms per 100,000 Jews in the district (by 1897 population) experienced in the districts, from among the 215 districts that were covered by the Ellis Island matching algorithm. Standard deviations are in parentheses. Upper rows report the averages in pogrom districts according to the merged list (Motzkin + AJYB); remaining rows report the two lists separately. Within each list, the *District* rows count all pogroms linked to the district, even if they were not identified down to a locality; *Locality* refers to pogroms that were identified down to a location (in coordinates); and *Shtetl* to pogroms that were linked to towns in the Shtetlach data. Each column reports a different severity threshold. *Any*: including pogroms with no details reported; *Minor*: material damage or at least one dead or wounded; *Major*: large material damage or at least one dead or wounded; *Violent*: at least one dead or wounded; *Deadly*: at least 10 dead or 50 wounded. Each severity level includes all levels above it (e.g., a major pogrom is also included within the minor pogrom).

## C A Case Study

### C.1 Kalarash and Orgieev District

Kalarash was a shtetl situated about 50 kilometers north-west of Kishinev, its surrounding countryside mostly settled by Moldovan peasants. It was a small market town in the district of Orgieev, part of the province of Bessarabia in the southern region of New-Russia. According to the 1897 census, the total population of the town was 5,153, of which 4,593 (89.1 percent) were Jews. Although this share of Jews was atypically high, it was certainly not unheard-of either.<sup>72</sup> Since Kalarash was not an administrative town (a *gorod*),<sup>73</sup> the census does not report additional town-level information, yet ample statistics are available on Orgieev district and some of these are presented in Table C1. Demographic statistics are reported in Panel A. The district as a whole counted 26,680 Jews (12.5 percent of total population), of which 73.3 percent were located in one of six localities identified in the shtetlach data (see Figure 4). I counted migration only from the district's four largest Jewish communities, and these communities covered 70.4 percent of the Jewish population in the district.<sup>74</sup> The share of females and the age distributions of Jews and non-Jews in Orgieev were quite similar, although Jews were about four times more literate than their neighbors.<sup>75</sup>

Like most Russian provinces, Orgieev mainly grew grains, but the mild climate also permitted the cultivation of grapes, as well as plums and other fruits. There was a wine industry, in which Jews were involved as growers, makers, and traders. The dual ethnic nature of Orgieev's labor market is apparent in Panel B of Table C1. Among the non-Jewish labor force, 79 percent of the workers were employed in agriculture, more than five times than among Jews.<sup>76</sup> On the other hand, a third of Jewish workers were employed in commerce, compared to 0.8 percent among non-Jews. Manufacturing captured a further 21.6 percent, and thus the commerce-manufacturing ratio of Jewish workers was 1.54, above that of 91 percent of the Pale's districts, and probably reflecting relative prosperity.

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<sup>72</sup> In fact, in two other similarly-sized shtetls in the district of Orgieev Jews constituted an overwhelming majority: Rezena (87.1 percent) and Teleneshty (88.5 percent). In Orgieev itself, the district's main town, 58 percent of the town's 12.3 thousand residents were Jews. Each of three more smaller localities in the district had a Jewish minority of 10-20 percent written in the census.

<sup>73</sup> In each district there were one or more administrative towns, on which the census provided further tabulations; on the gorods in the census see Rowland (1986, p. 115).

<sup>74</sup> As said earlier, to the extent that Jews immigrating from smaller localities in Orgieev district reported a nearby large city or just the name of the district, the effective coverage rate was probably greater.

<sup>75</sup> This Jewish advantage in literacy was typical for the region, but in Congress Poland Jews were often out-literated by others (Perlmann 1996).

<sup>76</sup> In fact, Jewish participation in agriculture was unusually *high* in this district: in only a handful of the Pale's 236 districts did it exceed 10 percent, whereas the Pale's overall average was a mere 2.6 percent.

## C.2 Kalarash's Associations

According to the landsmanshaftn data, Kalarash and the rest of Orgieev district were late-comers to U.S.-bound migration. Two associations of Kalarash immigrants were identified. The first, *First Kalarasher Benevolent Association*, was only incorporated in 1906. The second, *Karalasher Bessarabian Progressive Association*, followed in 1916.<sup>77</sup> Orgieev district had only one more landsmanshaft identified, *Progressive Orgeyev Aid Society*, incorporated in 1919, which was presumably related to the district's capital. Bessarabia province as a whole was rather late in founding migrant associations. By the time it incorporated its first landsmanshaft in 1891, it was preceded by twenty of the Pale's twenty-five provinces. By 1905 there were twenty-one Bessarabian associations, and twenty-five more were incorporated by 1919.

## C.3 Kalarash and the Pogroms

Bessarabia province was mostly spared during the first wave of pogroms, with only a single pogrom reported in the city of Kishinev in 1881.<sup>78</sup> However, during the second wave it found itself in the eye of the storm, starting with the 1903 Kishinev pogrom, and followed by dozens of other violent events during October 1905 [o.s.]. At ten o'clock in the morning of Sunday, October 23, 1905 [o.s.], a group of twenty Russian "hooligans" arrived at the railway station of Kalarash from Kishinev.<sup>79</sup> The market was already filled with a crowd of Moldovan peasants who came to purchase and sell in the market. Within a few minutes—according to one of the reports, after initiating a quarrel with a Jewish woman at her bread stall in the market—one of the hooligans stood up and called a short incitement speech ending with the battle cry "Now, brothers, it is time to slaughter the Jews!"

The wave of pogroms that started a few days earlier had not gone unnoticed, and the people understood well what was happening: Jews locked their shops and hid while the hooligans raided the commercial streets, plundering taverns, stores, homes, and storage houses. Some farmers began to turn their carts and escape back toward their villages, while others followed the inciters, tempted

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<sup>77</sup> The story of the founding of the latter was told by its first president, Joseph Einbinder, in a special booklet printed for the association's 18th anniversary. The ceremonial text was concluded with a sigh of relief, thanking God that "[...] in my older years I do not have to work so much for the society. There is someone to leave it to: our good and honest and well-known members who watch after it with their "eyes in their head." An English translation is available on [kehilalinks.jewishgen.org/calarasi/Einbinder.html](http://kehilalinks.jewishgen.org/calarasi/Einbinder.html).

<sup>78</sup> In contrast, the neighboring province of Kherson experienced 55 pogroms.

<sup>79</sup> The following description is based on several accounts of the Kalarash pogrom: A section in Motzkin's (1910, pp. 97–102) report; a detailed account of Kalarash in the aftermath of the pogrom within the memoir of Philip Cowen (1932, pp. 212–223), a Jewish American immigration officer working in Ellis Island who was nominated by president Theodore Roosevelt to travel to Russia and study the causes of the Jewish migration; and a section in Tamir et al. (1966, pp. 331–370), the *Yizkor* (memorial) book for Kalarash community written after it was all but wiped out during the holocaust, including a witness account published first as a Yiddish pamphlet in Odessa in 1906 by a young man by the name of Yaakov Chiplester. The accounts are generally consistent with one another, including many minute details.

by the opportunity to pillage with impunity. Police was absent, and a handful of members of a poorly armed self-defense group tried in vain to keep the perpetrators at bay. For a few hours the pogrom raged, and the town was filled with scenes of drunkenness, pillaging, beating, shooting, raping, killing, and mutilation of bodies. Many houses and all shops were burned down to the ground, including ones where entire Jewish families were hiding in cellars and attics. Dozens were burned alive. At four o'clock in the afternoon, a company of 55 soldiers arrived in town with the vice-governor, and the crowd was dispersed. But as the night came down, they raided the town once again and the pogrom resumed, finally ending only in the morning, when plunder opportunities were all but exhausted.

Motzkin (1910, p. 101) reported the following summary: 60 people killed, excluding an unknown number buried under the rubble, 75 severely wounded and 200 lightly wounded.<sup>80</sup> Two synagogues, a Talmud Torah (religious school), and 230 houses with 412 apartments were burned down, reducing 2,500 persons to “virtual beggary”, and 1 million Rubles of material damage;<sup>81</sup> While some pogroms during the wave of 1903–1906 were equally violent and deadly, relative to the modest size of the town, the number of casualties and the magnitude of the material damage make Kalarash a rather extreme case. Long time after the pogrom, despite support from donation funds, the town remained little more than its own wrecks. “[T]he once lively commercial center was transformed to a miserable pile of rubble, where blackened walls stand screaming to heaven as witnesses to the atrocity, and the homeless who shortly before have rejoiced in prosperity, are left to cry over the ruins of their property and reach for alms” (Motzkin 1910, pp. 101–102).

Other Jews in Orgieev district shared Kalarash’s misfortune. According to the AJYB list, Orgieev itself experienced a pogrom, although no damage was specified and Motzkin’s report remained mute on that. The district’s other two large Jewish communities were not listed as suffering a pogrom. Six villages that were noted on Motzkin’s report were identified as situated in the district. The number of families affected in each ranged between 9 and 47, and the estimated material damage from 12 to 42.8 thousand Rubles. As these were surely very small countryside Jewish communities, this material damage must have been severe.<sup>82</sup>

#### C.4 Kalarash Immigrants

On December 24, 1906, less than fourteen months after the pogrom, a group of Kalarash Jews was recorded embarking steamship Smolensk on the Russian Atlantic port of Libau (Libava), en

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<sup>80</sup> According to the AJYB list, there were 100 dead and 80 (severely?) wounded. According to Cowen (1932, p. 218), 42 were killed outright, 53 (severely?) wounded, of whom some died subsequently.

<sup>81</sup> According to the AJYB list and Chiplester’s account, the estimated damage exceeded 2 million Rubles. To give a sense of the magnitude of this loss, a yearly wage of a skilled worker would amount to roughly 300-500 Rubles in this region. Thus, an average Jewish household in Kalarash lost the equivalent of several years of income.

<sup>82</sup> One of these, Onishkany, was specifically mentioned in Chiplester’s account among a list of Jewish countryside communities that were ravaged by farmers returning to their villages after taking part in the Kalarash pogrom. He reported on two murdered Jews that were not recorded by Motzkin.

route to New York. Their details are presented in Table C2. Among them were the Axenfolds (mistakenly written as Axelfeld): A widowed grandmother, parents in their mid-thirties, and five children under the age of ten. The father, Itzik Axenfeld, was a tradesman.<sup>83</sup> They were said to be joining Samuel Spiwak, a brother in law, who lived in Syracuse, NY.<sup>84</sup> Samuel's son, a nine year old Jankel Spiwak, was also among the group, and so was another nephew, (a second) Idel Axenfeld, eleven years old. Another childless couple in their mid-thirties, Jankel and Feige Grünberg, came as well: the brother and sister in law of Itzik and Chane. Finally, there were a sixteen year old tailoress and a twenty-five year old tradesman.<sup>85</sup> The Axenfolds came with \$600, equivalent to 1200 Rubles, a hefty sum that was rarely in the possession of ordinary Jewish immigrants.

The Axenfolds and their company were unlike the quintessential labor migrants, men in their early working life, ready to take advantage of the opportunities offered to the young and able-bodied in the American labor market. Out of a group of fourteen, only four were labor-force participants. Were they driven out of Kalarash by the pogrom? No direct evidence can tell, but having depended on trade it is more likely than not that their businesses were wrecked. Furthermore, two hints suggest that they may have experienced personal losses. Naftole Schwarzman, the twenty-five year-old tradesman, was already a widower. He could, of course, have lost his wife through natural circumstances, such as maternal death, but this would still make him an unusual case.<sup>86</sup> It is not unlikely that he was among the twenty-three widowed by the Kalarash pogrom (Cowen 1932, p. 218). Additionally, a certain Selig Greenberg, seventy-five years old, was listed among the known pogrom victims.<sup>87</sup> While Greenberg was not the rarest of Jewish names, within a single town it is not far fetched to guess that Jankel Grünberg was his son, or otherwise a close relative.

Figure 7, plotting the number of Kalarash immigrants identified in the data in each of the sample years FY 1900–1914 shows a very clear structural break around the year of the pogrom: prior to 1906, there were no more than ten immigrants identified yearly coming from Kalarash. Suddenly their number peaked to almost eighty in FY 1906, of whom only four had immigrated in the first four months of the year (July-October 1905), prior to the outbreak of the pogrom. After a couple of years, the flow came down (as was the case for all U.S. immigration in the wake of the 1907 Panic and the ensuing recession), but remained above the pre-pogrom levels.

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<sup>83</sup> In later American documents I found him as a wine trader. Given the prominence of the wine industry within the economy of Kalarash, this was probably his specific occupation also prior to migration. More details learned from American genealogical resources were used here to expand the description of this group of immigrants.

<sup>84</sup> I was able to verify that indeed there was a Samuel Spiwak living in Syracuse. He immigrated in 1906 and a couple of years later he was residing within two blocks from 511 Harrison St., the address reported by the Axenfolds.

<sup>85</sup> I was unable to determine a certain family relation between the latter two and the Axenfolds.

<sup>86</sup> Out of 12,003 (predicted) Jewish males aged twenty-five in the data, only 13 (0.11%) were widowers.

<sup>87</sup> Tamir et al. (1966).

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Table C1: Orgieev District in 1897

	(1)	(2)
A. <i>Demographics</i>	Jews	Non-Jews
Female	0.503	0.489
Literacy	0.383	0.084
Age Groups		
Under 1	0.029	0.031
1–10	0.248	0.248
10–20	0.238	0.213
20–30	0.168	0.148
30–40	0.127	0.128
40–50	0.087	0.099
50–60	0.063	0.068
Over 60	0.040	0.065
Total pop.	26,680	186,798
B. <i>Occupations</i>		
Agriculture	0.147	0.790
Commerce	0.332	0.008
Manufacture	0.216	0.051
Prof. Services	0.047	0.039
Pers. Services	0.197	0.080
Transport	0.018	0.006
Other	0.042	0.025
LFP	0.286	0.225

Source: Calculations based on the 1897 Russian Census.

Note: Age groups shares may not sum to 1 due to an *unknown age* category. 65 occupations are grouped to categories according to Rubi-  
now (1907, p. 500).

Table C2: A Group of Kalarash Immigrants in the Data

(1) Last Name	(2) First Name	(3) Age	(4) Sex	(5) Marit.	(6) Occupation	(7) Literacy	(8) Paid by	(9) Money
Axelfeld	Hinde	67	f	wd	none	no	son	600
Axelfeld	Itzik [Ytzik]	37	m	m	tradesman	yes	self	
Axelfeld	Chane	34	f	m	none	no	husband	
Axelfeld	Idel [Ydel]	8	m	s	child	yes	father	
Axelfeld	Tewie	11m	m	s	child	no	father	
Axelfeld	Sure	9	f	s	child	yes	father	
Axelfeld	Taube	7	f	s	child	no	father	
Axelfeld	Rebeka	3	f	s	child	no	father	
Schwarzman	Naftole	25	m	wd	tradesman	no	self	12.5
Grünberg	Jankel [Yankel]	37	m	m	tradesman	yes	self	50
Grünberg	Feige	34	f	m	none	no	husband	
Grobokopatel	Blume	16	f	s	tailoress	yes	uncle	10
Spiwak	Jankel [Yankel]	9	m	s	child	yes	uncle	
Axelfeld	Idel [Ydel]	11	m	s	child	no	uncle	

Source: Ellis Island arrival records, passenger list of Steamship Smolensk, embarked from Libau on Dec. 24, 1906, arrived in New York on Jan. 15, 1907.

Notes: First names were corrected when necessary, the inaccurately transcribed names are presented in brackets. The family "Axenfeld" was also misspelled in the manifests. Further fields common to all immigrant in this group—Nationality: Russia; race or people: Hebrew; last place of residence: Kalarasch; Destination: Syracuse, NY. Fields in cols. 1–5 are among the fields transcribed in the Ellis Island data. Fields in cols. 6–9 were not transcribed, and were read from the scanned manifest. Literacy was separated to ability to read and write, but for all immigrants in this groups the two fields had the same values. Paid by (col. 8): by whom was the passage paid. Money (col. 9): how much money the person possess (U.S. dollars).